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1 
Introduction 
 
 
General Introduction: Austerity and the State 
 
Reflecting on a period of significant Marxist theorising about the state that 
occurred during the 1960s and 1970s, Leo Panitch (1999) concluded that state theory 
had, by the end of the 1990s, become ‘impoverished’. This assessment was directed at 
the work of those writers who tended to study the state independently of any proper 
recognition of its enmeshment in broader social and economic relationships. This 
tendency continues to bedevil analyses of the nature and direction of state action since 
the 2007-08 global financial crisis (GFC). It has been especially evident in studies of 
austerity – understood as a set of public policy initiatives that aim to cut state 
expenditures so as to reduce budget deficits and accumulated public debt. This will, 
its proponents claim, promote economic growth through encouraging competitiveness 
and business investment (see Blyth 2013a: 2; Bougrine 2000a: 11). Notably, these 
studies attach a great deal of importance to the ideas held by state elites. Politics and 
power are thus understood and explained as the product of the particular ideas that 
state elites have about the world, and the application of these ideas to processes of 
policymaking. Moreover, despite numerous failures to actually re-ignite economic 
growth, the persistent implementation of austerity policies by states across the globe 
is explained as the result of the continuing grip that austerity, as an economic idea, 
has over the minds of state managers (Blyth 2013a, 2013b, 2013c; Krugman 2013b). 
Despite critiques of this tendency to focus on the ideas held by state managers 
independently of a broader analysis of the conflicts between the competing interests 
and social forces that promote these ideas, such perspectives remain significant in 
studies of the trajectory of political economies in the post-GFC period. As Damien 
Cahill (2014: viii) has recently argued, these accounts may be appropriately 
characterised as ‘idealist, or ideas-centred’, in which ideas about the world are held to 
be the main drivers and determinants of political economic change. 
 
Ideas-centred approaches have certainly influenced discussions of the 
Australian state’s turn to austerity in 2014. Accounts of austerity in Australia have 
drawn a clear line of causation between the state’s policy choices and the intellectual 
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dominance – at least in elite policy circles – of ‘neoliberal’ political and economic 
philosophies. Critics of austerity, as well as its proponents, have argued that austerity 
policies accord to the laissez-faire vision proposed by neoliberal theorists. In this way, 
austerity is taken to promote, in principle and practice, the advance of markets as the 
most efficient means of coordinating economic and social activity through the 
reduction of forms of state interference and intervention in economic life (Cahill 
2014: viii; Harvey 2005: 2). While critics generally are sceptical of the capacity for 
these (allegedly) ‘free’ markets to deliver harmonious and equitable social outcomes, 
some have nonetheless advanced the view that all that is needed to combat these 
misguided policy decisions is the articulation of a rival ideology and the political will 
to impose it (Lloyd & Ramsay 2014/15: 49; McAllister 2014). 
 
The argument advanced in this thesis challenges these ideational or ideas-
centred views, as austerity is the product of more than just the mechanical application 
of particular ideas to processes of policymaking. Instead, this thesis argues that 
austerity is a political project, actively constructed and shaped in the interests of 
particular social forces operating on the terrain of the state. Scholars that claim all that 
is required to reverse austerity’s ideological grip – and, therefore, its deleterious social 
effects – is the political will to do so fundamentally misunderstand the nature of the 
capitalist state, the agency of state managers, and underestimate the powers of those 
social forces and structures that confront austerity’s opponents. In developing this 
argument, the thesis draws upon some of the core insights of Marxist state theory that 
argue the state and economy cannot be studied in abstraction from the social relations 
of capitalism (Jessop 1990; Panitch 1999). The adoption of this approach to the 
analysis of austerity highlights the misleading character of (even progressive) claims 
that such policies necessarily mark a withdrawal of the state from the management of 
economic life. Instead, it points to the crucial role that states continue to play in the 
expanded reproduction of capitalist economic and social relationships. For some, the 
application of these basic Marxist claims to an analysis of the Australian experience 
may appear to be hardly novel. Yet, as Dunn (2014: 418) has written with regard to 
austerity, Marxist state theoretical ‘observations might seem rather banal, were they 
not ignored by much mainstream and even putatively radical economic theory’. 
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Austerity in Australia: Thesis Context and Structure 
 
Though not Australia’s first experience with austerity, the particular project 
discussed in this thesis concerns the policies and actions of the Liberal-National Party 
Coalition (LNP) following their formation of government after the 2013 federal 
election. Led by former Prime Minister Tony Abbott, the particular nature of the 
austerity policies that were first proposed by the LNP government in its 2014-15 
Federal Budget have not been as extensive as those pursued elsewhere in the world.1 
Nonetheless, little has been written that directly attempts to explain the origins and 
sources of austerity in Australia, and its resilience even in the face of significant 
opposition. Though many analysts have begun to ask why this particular path has 
been taken (Marks 2015; Stilwell 2014; Varoufakis 2014), such questions have not 
been systematically or adequately explored. 
 
The austerity policies of the Abbott government were initially constructed and 
justified in light of an apparent ‘budget emergency’ – a problem that could, it was 
argued, only be resolved through a concerted effort to end what former Treasurer Joe 
Hockey (2012) called the ‘age of entitlement’. In the 2014-15 Federal Budget, 
Hockey proposed a range of deep, albeit highly selective, cuts to state expenditure. 
Austerity was to see changes to welfare and social services arrangements, healthcare 
provision, foreign aid, education funding, and public sector employment. Federal 
government figures initially projected that these changes, if implemented, would 
produce a return to budgetary surplus around fiscal year 2018-19 (Commonwealth of 
Australia 2014b: section 1-8). Despite impediments encountered in the actual 
implementation of policy, and the downgrading of government receipts due to 
changing economic conditions, the government continued to express optimism in their 
2015-16 Budget projections the following year, with just a one-year delay in a return 
to surplus (Commonwealth of Australia 2015b: section 1-8). The actual figures quoted 
in Budget documents are, of course, speculative and problematic, projecting fiscal 
stability on the basis of essentially unknowable economic conditions (Beckert 2013). 
The accuracy of government predictions is not, however, a direct concern of this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Malcolm Turnbull replaced Abbott as Prime Minister in September 2015 (Alston 2015). 
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thesis. What is of central concern is the notion that the targeted cuts to those particular 
areas of state expenditure outlined above are not incidental; there is a reason there has 
been no substantial cut to corporate subsidies (Mansillo 2014). This has to do with the 
nature of austerity as a political project. The thesis thus addresses itself to the 
questions, ‘how should we understand and explain the rise, various impacts, and 
fluctuating fortunes of austerity in Australia under the Abbott government’? It will be 
argued that an answer to these questions must be firmly grounded in an analysis of 
capitalism and conflicts over its social relations. 
 
The thesis is divided into four chapters. Chapter One examines dominant 
idealist and ideational explanations of austerity. It argues that, as a result of a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the ontological nature and role of states in capitalist 
societies, these perspectives are unable to explain the historical emergence of austerity 
policies. Through adopting an alternative understanding of the state and state power 
that is better able to explain the rise of austerity, this chapter argues austerity must be 
understood as a political project. Turning to more empirical matters, Chapter Two 
traces the emergence of an austerity politics in Australia, and its eventual 
development into a political project. It argues that this project was constructed by 
particular fractions of capital and state managers, configured through the prior 
construction and framing of political economic crises. The third chapter returns to the 
ideology of austerity in Australia, and argues that the understanding of austerity’s 
ideological underpinnings is essential for explaining the nature of austerity as a 
political project. Specifically, it explores the ways in which pro-austerity narratives 
obscure the inherently political character of austerity policies, and so naturalise the 
class interests that they serve. The final chapter ties this discussion together through 
an overview of the development of the Abbott government’s agenda in the face of 
political resistance and changing economic conditions. Contrary to those who argue 
state power is ‘waning’ in the face of advancing market forces, Chapter Four traces 
the way in which the exercise of state power remains central to the maintenance and 
promotion of austerity as a political project. 
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Chapter One 
 
Theorising Austerity: State, Structure, and Ideology 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter establishes the basis of an approach that allows for a conceptually 
informed understanding of austerity as a materially grounded political project. In 
particular, it argues that austerity needs to be understood as the product of the material 
forces, conflicts, and structures that drive political and economic change. Instead of 
understanding austerity as reflecting the (however misguided) desire of state 
managers to reduce the state’s role in economic management, this chapter stresses the 
importance of understanding the factors of cohesion and interests that work to 
underpin austerity. First, the chapter provides a brief outline of the dominant idealist 
approach to understanding neoliberalism in general, and austerity in particular. In 
light of this discussion, the second section highlights the way in which these idealist 
or ideational perspectives rest on a misleading understanding of the role of the state in 
political economic change. In response, the chapter develops a more fruitful way of 
thinking about states and markets in capitalist societies by drawing on strands of 
Marxist scholarship. It is argued that while ideas certainly matter, a more nuanced 
understanding of austerity as an expression of the exercise of state power must 
explore the complex interrelations between and intersection of ideology, interests, 
conflict, and social structure. 
 
Idealism, Neoliberalism, and Austerity 
 
For many writing about the consolidation of state finances since the global 
financial crisis, the problem of austerity is understood principally to be about the clash 
of ideas. Nowhere has this understanding been more evident than in the work of Mark 
Blyth (2013a, 2013b, 2013c), whose monograph – Austerity: the history of a 
dangerous idea – has been at the centre of contemporary debates (see Jabko 2013; 
Peck 2013; Streeck 2013; Thompson 2013). Blyth details the history of austerity 
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through its emergence as an economic idea, and contrasts these theoretical 
underpinnings against its major historical failures (see also Elson 2013; Krugman 
2013a; Schui 2014). To explain the rise and continued adoption of this failed policy 
regime by states across the globe since the crisis, Blyth stresses the durability of 
neoliberal ideas, and the neoclassical economic theories that underpin them (Blyth 
2013a: 152-8). Thus, he writes: 
 
Austerity … has been an unmitigated failure … And yet it continues. Why? … If this 
is creditor/debtor politics, then the creditors are being hurt just as much as debtors, 
and yet there has been no policy reversal … This is what pushes me to push ideology 
to the fore. ‘Good’ ideologies … are frameworks for action that have one defining 
feature: they are immune to empirical refutation. They persist and grow despite the 
evidence. (Blyth 2013b: 738-9, original emphasis) 
 
In this sense, Blyth’s emphasis on ideology draws on certain approaches to 
political economy. Though far from a unified approach to the problems of political 
economic change, the concern with the study of ideas emerges from what scholars 
refer to as the ‘ideational turn’ in political science and political economy (Blyth 1997, 
2003; Gofas & Hay 2010b). As explored further below, such views emphasise that 
ideas are important variables in political analysis in their own right, and cannot simply 
be understood as reflections of deeper material factors. They thus reject the ‘perennial 
dualisms’ that flow from an ontological distinction between the ideational and the 
material (Gofas & Hay 2010a: 3-5). A particularly dominant set of approaches that 
has contributed to this burgeoning ideational scholarship is social constructivism, 
which takes material interests not as given either by structures or institutions, but as 
ideationally constructed. Social constructivists thus ascribe transformations in 
political economic order to the way in which ideas shape the actions of agents in a 
given context, and, through these actions, come to form a web of ‘intersubjective 
meaning’, informing and framing interests and agency. This, scholars claim, 
integrates the material and the ideational in a dialectic relationship, where ideas are 
‘causally constitutive’ of material relations (Gofas & Hay 2010c: 50). 
 
However, as Bieler and Morton (2008: 109) have argued, ‘the problem of 
social constructivism, as a theory of history, is that it is grounded in an idealist 
understanding of transformations in social relations because of the disembedding of 
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intersubjective ideas, norms and values from the social relations in which they 
cohere’. There is thus an implicit understanding in social constructivism that, despite 
an apparent dialectic relation, the ideal and material are ‘always and already 
separate’, which, in particular circumstances, ‘are then brought together as a set of 
constraints that agents respond to’ (Bruff 2011: 85, original emphasis). In 
understanding ideas as productive of effects that are external to the nature of 
particular social relations, the problem confronting constructivists and other ideational 
scholars is thus a preoccupation with questions of ‘how’ certain ideas come to 
dominate, without an adequate explanation of ‘why’ ideas emerge as dominant when 
and where they do. 
 
Arguments that replicate the social constructivist understanding of austerity 
have emerged time and again in the work of putatively critical scholars, where a 
commitment to austerity as an economic idea is understood to be the sole, or at least 
main explanation for its continuity (see Quiggin 2012: 209-39; Skidelsky 2015: 380). 
In the same vein, in the immediate aftermath of the GFC many argued the crisis 
heralded the end of neoliberalism’s ideological grip over global capitalism. 
Concomitantly, fiscal stimulus programs adopted by states were interpreted as 
signalling an end to the neoliberal, free market-led epoch, and a return to Keynesian 
ideas and a period of state-led economic governance (Rudd 2009). However, the 
renewed assault of austerity and other policies associated with neoliberalism cast 
significant doubt on this interpretation of events, leading commentators to conclude 
that neoliberal, ‘zombie’ ideas were not so easily displaced (Mirowski 2014; Quiggin 
2012). The ideological hegemony of neoliberalism has thus been central to explaining 
the practice of austerity. 
 
Crucially, however, the understandings of neoliberalism that dominated these 
arguments have been highly problematic. Scholars have assumed, for whatever 
reason, that the ‘neoliberal era’ is one that saw the advance of ‘free’ markets, and a 
withering of the state. As Cahill (2014: 15-6) recognises, this interpretation is at least 
partly understandable, given the correlation of neoliberal theoretical prescriptions to 
the actual political practices of capitalist states. However, as Panitch and Konings 
(2009: 68) have written: 
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The central problem with this [idealist] perspective is the tendency to analyse the 
financial dynamics of the past decades within the terms of that era’s hegemonic self-
representation—that is, through the key tenets of neoliberal ideology: the retreat of 
public institutions from social and economic life, and the return to a pre-Keynesian 
era of non-intervention. 
 
As Cahill (2014: 8) argues, two implicit assumptions underpin these ideas-
centred, or idealist understandings of neoliberalism. The first is that the concrete 
reality of the ‘neoliberal era’ reflects neoliberal ideas, and the second that the shift to 
the neoliberal epoch was driven by the influence of these ideas and their proponents. 
Because of the way in which the idea of austerity is encompassed within broader 
neoliberal ideational frameworks, the deployment and intended effect of austerity 
policies is similarly understood. Indeed, the implementation of austerity policies is 
understood as driven by the influence of neoliberal ideas and the intellectuals, such as 
Milton Friedman and Friedrich von Hayek, who express them (Blyth 2013a: 104-77). 
Furthermore, while scholars have recognised that austerity policies have not worked 
in ways projected for them – that is, they have not been successful in ‘reducing [state] 
debt and promoting growth’ (Blyth 2013a: 4) – this is not dissimilar of critiques of 
other neoliberal policies. The logic of idealism remains, however, insofar as it is 
assumed that, given the right economic conditions, austerity would reduce the ‘size’ 
of the state as theoretically claimed, even if these conditions are ‘highly specific’, and 
‘do not happen to describe the world in which we live at the moment’ (Blyth 2013a: 
97). While this recognises that there are real impediments to the realisation of 
theoretical projections, there is nevertheless an enduring commitment to the belief that 
the state is ‘reduced’ merely through decreasing the size of its budget (for critique, see 
Chester 2008: 9). Importantly, then, idealist understandings of austerity explain its 
persistence with reference to the hegemony of certain ideas about the state in which 
austerity finds its home. Similarly, they mistakenly assume that the state’s concrete 
reality actually operates according to the logic of those ideas. Having outlined, albeit 
broadly, the dominant framing of austerity, the chapter now turns to explore in more 
detail these misleading views about the nature of the state in idealist, or ideational 
understandings.  
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Ideas, the State, and Double Movements 
 
A dominant conceptualisation of austerity policies sees it to be the product of 
particular ideas, which further the ‘neoliberal’ objective to advance ‘free’ markets 
through curtailing state intervention in economic management. The influence of this 
understanding has certainly been evident even in more progressive commentaries on 
the turn to austerity by the Australian federal government in 2014. Writers have 
understood the imposition of austerity to be driven by an enduring commitment on 
behalf of state managers to neoliberal ideas. In particular, the claim is that austerity 
has represented a move to reduce the role of the Australian state in economic 
management (Aly 2014; Lloyd & Ramsay 2014/15). Take, for example, Lloyd & 
Ramsay’s (2014/15: 42) claim following the election of the LNP that: 
 
[T]he orthodox neoliberal (small state) policy has not changed on the right of 
Australian conservative politics … when we observe the … federal budget’s fiscal 
ideology of austerity … These ideological expressions and extreme measures … 
show that … the current Abbott government … has not just continued the neoliberal 
status quo but pushed it considerably further. 
 
These authors thus assume that neoliberal ideas in general, and austerity in particular, 
presage an attenuation of the state and state power. This thesis challenges this idealist 
view, arguing that it is underpinned by an inadequate understanding of the ontology of 
the capitalist state. 
 
At this point, two related critiques can be made. First, the ontology of states 
and markets underpinning idealist accounts has been informed by the Polanyian 
concept of the ‘double movement’ (see Cahill 2014: 7-8; Konings 2015).2 Pre-
neoliberal economic arrangements are understood to have been embedded in 
particular sets of social foundations. Following the imposition of neoliberal ideas, 
with their prescriptions regarding states and markets, the latter become 
‘disembedded’, and operate independently from social and political constraints (see 
Blyth 2002: 5-6, 2013a: 162-3). This understanding becomes increasingly possible if 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 It is noted that the concept of the ‘double movement’ is based on a contested interpretation 
of Polanyi’s work. Recently scholars have argued that Polanyi (2001 [1944]) actually 
developed the concept of the ‘always embedded’ economy (Cahill 2014: 62). 
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one views ideas to be the main determinant of historical change. For, insofar as 
neoliberal ideas contain a prescriptive outline of the appropriate role of the state, the 
extension of these ideas to reality must necessarily entail the actual separation of the 
state from the economy (Cahill 2014: 8). Of course, no causal relation has been 
empirically demonstrated. Indeed, those scholars who have paid attention to the 
historical record have repeatedly noted the divergence of actual political practice from 
these theoretical prescriptions (Cahill 2014; Panitch & Gindin 2012). This divergence, 
however, demonstrates a theoretical point that has been made by those working in the 
Marxist tradition. This insight, at its core, challenges the notion that the economy can 
ever become ‘disembedded’ from socio-political relations, or that the capitalist state 
could ever operate autonomously from conflicts and struggles over the structure and 
possible transformation of economic arrangements. 
 
In addition to the misleading nature of disembedding narratives, idealist 
accounts offer a description of change that provides no historical explanation of why 
particular ideas emerge when they do. In this sense, they often adopt – either 
implicitly or explicitly – an essentially voluntarist understanding of the state. 
Indicative of this kind of explanation, Blyth (2013a: 39) writes: 
 
Economic theory is … causally important in the world, and not just a correspondent 
reflection of it … Different theories tell us which rules to pick, which policies to 
follow, and how to design institutions, providing different payoffs to different groups, 
in the process changing the world that the theories purport to map. 
 
While it may be right to say that ideas are more than simply a ‘correspondent 
reflection’ of the world, Blyth’s (2013a: 158) notion, which flows from the above 
quote, that the process of policymaking can be simply explained by the adoption or 
acceptance of an economic theory by state managers is inadequate. It is in this way 
that explanations of change which defer to the power of economic ideas embody a 
voluntarist understanding of the state. This is because the choice of policy alternatives 
available to state managers is understood to be largely unconstrained by the specific 
political economic context within which they operate. Though the dominance of some 
ideas is acknowledged, there is little offered in the way of explaining why some 
economic policy alternatives prevail over others. This particular voluntarism is thus 
intrinsically idealist, as it treats the exercise of ‘power as an outgrowth of pure 
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consciousness or will’ (Isaac 1987: 90). What ideas are chosen to inform policy, and 
which groups are privileged above others is largely understood to be a matter of 
political will or autonomous choice for those who are (formally) invested with the 
capacity to exercise state powers. 
 
Through the ontology of the state that flows from both disembedding and 
voluntarist narratives, idealist perspectives understand the state in abstraction from the 
economy and society. In seeing the state as necessarily diminishing because of the 
imposition of neoliberal policies – such as austerity – these analyses fundamentally 
misunderstand the nature of the state and its relation to the capitalist economy. 
Indeed, the very notion that ‘states’ could be considered separate from, or a 
fundamentally different sphere of organisation to ‘markets’ relies on an understanding 
of these categories that lacks any historical specificity (Panitch 1999: 24-5). In 
particular, it ignores the evolution and interrelation of states with the synchronous 
development of the social relations of capitalist production, which take the form of an 
internal relation between capital and wage-labour, defined through the former’s 
exploitation of, and extraction of surplus value from the labour of the latter (Bieler & 
Morton 2008: 116). While the state and economy may be differentiated from one 
another in strictly theoretical terms, this is not to say that there has ever been anything 
like a real separation. Capitalist relations have historically relied on forms of extra-
economic (state) action to secure, produce, and reproduce the conditions necessary for 
their continuity (Cahill 2014: 72-3). Similarly, states have increasingly become reliant 
on the successes of capital accumulation for their basic functioning. As a result, the 
actions of state managers cannot be viewed in abstraction from this relation. The 
history of capitalism has thus seen the increasing enmeshment and structural 
interrelation between the political and economic. 
 
It therefore makes little sense to talk of neoliberalism and austerity as marking 
the withdrawal of the state from the economic sphere, as the relationship between 
these two spheres is not quantitatively measurable (Chester 2008: 9). To say the 
economy is becoming increasingly disentangled from states and the operations of 
state power is thus to fundamentally ignore the way in which both are constituted and 
mediated by social relations. If the state and the capitalist economy and its class 
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relations appear formally separate or institutionally autonomous, this autonomy is 
ever only relative. Thus, as Jeffrey Isaac (1987: 165-6) writes: 
 
The concept of relative autonomy denotes the structural relation between class 
relations and the state. Each is a condition of the others’ existence, and each is in this 
sense implicated in the other, while at the same time maintaining its own respective 
autonomy. Because of this essential and necessary relation between state and class, 
because the state is what it is in virtue of its relationship to class relations, and vice 
versa, they are only relatively autonomous. (emphasis added) 
 
The state and state power, under neoliberal conditions, have not become increasingly 
separate from capitalist class relationships, nor have they operated independently of 
the conflict and dynamics that define those relationships. In this context, the concept 
of relative autonomy encourages us to recognise the manner in which the state and 
markets – the political and the economic – have become entangled and enmeshed in 
changing and different ways. This understanding of the necessary and mutually 
determining relation between the state and economy offers a sound ontological, and 
analytically more useful approach to explain the rise of austerity programs. In 
particular, it is through this lens that we can begin to understand austerity’s nature as a 
political project, as economic forces are never truly separate or autonomous from the 
political forces and structures that govern their production and reproduction. 
 
Indeed, it has been argued by ideas-focused scholars that neoliberalism and 
austerity shift political economic conditions in favour of capital, yet such explanations 
face the problem of demonstrating how this shift in the balance of power actually 
occurs (see, for example, Dow 2015: 37; Lloyd & Ramsay 2014/5: 41). This is 
because such arguments operate with an inadequate conceptualisation of the state and 
state power and its relation to class, and other forms of social power. In remedying 
these problems, in light of that detailed above, neoliberalism can be understood as a 
particular historical period within the broader history of capitalist development, in 
which the interests of capital have become increasingly ‘internalized within specific 
forms of the state’ (Bieler, Bruff & Morton 2010: 31). This historical and conjunctural 
reconfiguration of state-economy relations ‘organic to the epoch of capitalist 
development’ (Bieler, Bruff & Morton 2010: 31) was crucially driven, and continues 
to be driven in varying ways and in various contexts, not just by ideas but also by 
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competing material forces, conflicts, and social processes (Jessop 2013: 70-2). This is 
not to suggest that there has been a clear and direct epochal shift from the ‘Keynesian-
Fordist golden age’ (Chester 2008: 10) that characterised the post-war years to 
neoliberalism. However, what, at least in part, determined the neoliberal shift in 
advanced capitalist countries like Australia was the outcome of struggles between 
competing domestic social forces and interests, shaped in response to conflicts 
associated with the stalling of capital accumulation. As elsewhere, the result of these 
conflicts was a reconfiguration of the overall balance of forces in favour of capital 
over labour and other subordinate interests (Jessop 2013: 71). Considered in this 
sense, and as Lichten (1986: 24) writes, ‘[a]usterity is … the articulation of a … class 
politic; one which redirects state activity, specifically its budgetary/fiscal politics, to 
fulfil and enhance the accumulation of capital’. In developing an alternative 
theoretical framework for understanding these changes the chapter now turns to an 
elaboration of key concepts from the Marxist tradition. 
 
Ideology, Interests, and State Power 
 
The idealist thesis of political economic change, insofar as it pertains to 
austerity, is concerned in part with the process of interest formation. As highlighted in 
Blyth’s work, there exists a certain scepticism regarding the role that interests play in 
driving the actions taken by certain forces. If a course of action would appear to 
contradict an agent’s actual interests in a given situation then it cannot be those 
interests themselves that explain why such action would be taken (Blyth 2013b: 738-
9). In such a situation, ‘agents’ interests become something to be explained, rather 
than something with which to do the explaining’ (Blyth 2002: 9). More particularly, 
in this view the notion that one is acting on one’s interests, absent other qualifications, 
necessarily entails assuming that they are acting on their ‘true’, or objective interests. 
As knowing what one’s objective interests are in any given situation is improbable, 
considering that it requires the possession of ‘perfect information’, then such interests 
cannot simply be ‘read off’ an agent’s structural location – that is, their gender, class, 
race, and so on (Blyth 2002: 28). To speak of interests therefore requires that one 
acknowledge the ideas that shape and construct interests. That is, ideas must ‘exist 
prior to individuals and give meaning and content to their preferences’ (Blyth 1997: 
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239; see also Gofas & Hay 2010c: 24).3 One ought therefore to abandon dualism and 
conceive of ideas and interests as analytically interdependent (Blyth 2002: 29). Ideas 
are seen to provide a necessary ‘framework’ or ‘blueprint’ through which agents’ 
interests are constructed. 
 
Again, it is possible to make two related critiques here. First, though ideas 
certainly matter, the notion that interests are not ‘given’ by social structure is 
misleading as it operates with a one-dimensional – ‘objective’, or ‘true’ – 
understanding of interests. In exploring the issue of social power, Isaac provides a 
more nuanced discussion of interests. He argues: 
 
Rather than A getting B to do something B would not otherwise do, social relations of 
power typically involve both A and B doing what they ordinarily do … [N]either a 
conflict of revealed preferences, nor of objective interests, must be discovered in 
order to attribute power to these roles. (Isaac 1987: 96, original emphasis) 
 
Here Isaac points to the role of social structure in the formation of interests. In 
addition to subjective interests, as those ‘revealed preferences that are actually held by 
particular agents’, and objective interests, ‘or what is really in the interest, or good, of 
an agent, whether he or she thinks so or not’, Isaac (1987: 96-8) introduces the 
concept of real interests. Real interests refer to ‘those norms, values, and rationalities 
implicit in the practices of social life and associated with social roles as their 
principles of action’ (Isaac 1987: 98). Crucially, the existence of both subjective 
interests and real interests points to the way in which the latter are causally effective 
even if they are not consciously recognised as an agent’s primary preference. In this 
sense, real interests, insofar as they involve ‘A and B doing what they ordinarily do’, 
are shaped by the material imperatives created by enduring structural relationships. 
 
In addition, idealist perspectives adopt an understanding of ideas and interests 
as interdependent, but nonetheless separate variables. In reference to Blyth, Bieler and 
Morton (2008: 108) write that ‘[h]e adopts a dualistic view of material structure and 
ideas that are always-already separated as variables that are then combined in their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 This formulation is not merely a feature of Blyth’s earlier theorising. He has since, in much 
closer proximity to his writings on austerity, restated his position on this matter (see Blyth 
2010: 168). 
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external relationship to one another’. As already stated, without an understanding of 
ideas as internally related to material structure and interests, idealist accounts offer no 
explanation of why certain ideas become important when they do. The precise nature 
of the error lies in conceiving of ideas as forming in abstraction from social relations, 
interests, and struggle. An approach that instead sees ideas as forming through 
processes of struggle between competing social forces and interests can thus more 
adequately describe historical change (Bieler & Morton 2008: 119; Hall 1986: 41). 
Moreover, as ideas emerge in this way from material conditions, then such ideas, or 
ideologies necessarily offer a particular reflection of the nature and operation of that 
structure, and thus ascribe social meaning to the relations and interests that comprise 
it (Isaac 1987: 100-1). It is in this sense that ideologies are tied to the process of 
domination (Thompson 1984: 4). For, if such ideologies imbue different interests with 
particular social meanings in a way that justifies the nature and relationship of these 
interests to others, it is not difficult to see how ideology therefore naturalises the 
social relations of power inherent in everyday practices and reifies them as objective 
social facts (Bieler & Morton 2008: 115; Isaac 1987: 100-1). It is in this light that we 
ought to analyse and understand austerity. Austerity does not solely emerge in virtue 
of its appeal as an idea, but through the way in which it reflects and secures the 
interests of certain social forces engaged in ideological struggle. Ideas are thus 
certainly important. However, as Stuart Hall (1986: 42) writes: 
 
Ideas only become effective if they do, in the end, connect with a particular 
constellation of social forces. In that sense, ideological struggle is part of the general 
social struggle. 
 
Ideas cannot be understood independently of the social relations and processes of 
struggle to which they are internally related. 
 
An understanding of austerity’s nature as a distinct political project also 
requires alternative understanding of the state and state power. Although often treated 
implicitly, state power is central to ideational explanations of austerity. In these 
perspectives austerity is understood as the outcome of the exercise of state power to 
the extent that those actors who occupy positions within the state are captive to the 
idea of austerity. Under this conception idealist explanations are unable to recognise 
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the structural ways in which austerity can ‘make sense’ for particular forces and 
interests (Dunn 2014). Yet it is precisely with reference to the material forces and 
interests that drive neoliberal processes that the apparent paradox of austerity – that it 
persistently fails, but nonetheless continues apace – actually dissolves (Albo & Evans 
2011: 285; Dunn 2014: 418). 
 
An understanding of austerity must be grounded, then, in a definition of state 
power that recognises the relative autonomy of state and societal forces. Authors 
working within the Marxist tradition have developed such an understanding. While 
there is not the space here to provide a comprehensive review of this literature, a 
number of conceptual tools developed within this theoretical tradition are relevant for 
this thesis. As Bob Jessop (2014: 485) writes: 
 
[S]tate power is the form-determined (institutionally-mediated) condensation of a 
shifting balance of forces oriented to the exercise of capacities and powers associated 
with particular political forms and institutions as these are embedded in the wider 
social formation. 
 
On this formulation, exercises of state power cannot simply be considered solely as 
the product of autonomous or voluntary decisions by state managers, but must instead 
be understood in relation to the political economic context in which states are always 
embedded. In virtue of the state’s ‘sui generis reality’ (Isaac 1987: 155) – in 
particular, the development of its role as a central locus for the manufacturing of the 
conditions necessary for capitalism’s expanded reproduction – it is inscribed with a 
strategic ‘selectivity’ in its relation to material forces. This selectivity means that the 
state cannot be viewed as operating autonomously from society, as ‘its apparatuses 
and practices are materially interdependent with other institutional orders and social 
practices’ (Jessop 2008: 5). 
 
A number of implications follow from this. Though the institutions of the state 
apparatus may possess their own independent powers, the state under capitalism is 
ultimately dependent upon the successes of capital accumulation and the development 
of political capacities and resources held elsewhere within a social formation. As a 
result, if only in part, the state is differentially constituted to privilege the pursuit of 
control over state capacities to certain social forces and interests due to the distinctive 
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powers in their possession (Jessop 2008: 6). However, this forces a crucial qualifier. 
While the state is variously compelled to promote the accumulation of capital, as it 
relies on the resources and revenue that stem from this, this imperative rests on an 
essential contradiction. As James O’Connor (2009: 6) writes, ‘the capitalistic state 
must try to fulfill two basic and often mutually contradictory functions—
accumulation and legitimization … This means that the state must try to maintain or 
create the conditions in which profitable capital accumulation is possible. However, 
the state also must try to maintain or create the conditions for social harmony’. These 
insights highlight the way in which the state comes to be, in virtue of the unique 
capacities ascribed to state power, the object of social struggle; that is, the state, as the 
primary medium through which to realise particular objectives, is also a site and 
terrain of conflict. Social struggle directed to the exercise of state power is, however, 
always mediated through the way in which the unique and evolving structure of any 
given state serves as a determinant in the outcome of such conflict. This is due to the 
way in which certain state institutions become inscribed with a strategic selectivity on 
the basis of the powers and resources available to those forces pursuing state power 
(Isaac 1987: 184; Jessop 2009: 379-80). The ultimate outcome of struggle, and thus 
the exercise of state power, is similarly mediated by the relations that form between 
politicians and state managers – those ‘formally invested with state power’ (Miliband 
1969: 50, original emphasis) – and broader political forces, as well as the nature and 
articulation of the state’s embeddedness in its broader social environment. To 
conclude, as Jessop (2008: 6) emphasises: 
 
Putting states in their place like this does not exclude (indeed, it presupposes) 
specifically state-engendered and state-mediated processes. It does require, however, 
that they be related both to their broader social context and to the strategic choices 
and conduct of actors in and beyond states. 
 
It is in consideration of these insights that austerity is understood as a political project; 
as the outcome of the exercise of state power produced through a particular balance of 
social forces and interests. 
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter has developed an approach to theorising, understanding, and 
explaining the paradoxical continuity of austerity. In particular, it has highlighted, 
through the lens of Marxist state theory, some of the specific ways in which ideational 
explanations of the rise of austerity offer inadequate understandings of political 
economic change. In particular, these ideational or idealist perspectives create an 
essentially voluntarist conception of state power, explaining the exercise of such 
power as the product of the more or less autonomous decisions of state managers. 
Moreover, involved in the construal of state power in this manner is the Polanyian 
narrative of a double movement, which ignores the internal relation of the state and 
the economy by virtue of a complex of social relationships. The final section of this 
chapter developed a view of austerity sensitive to the complex set of imperatives and 
processes of legitimation created by ideology, interests, and social structure. In light 
of this, the chapter outlined some conceptual tools geared to the explanation of 
austerity’s rise, its basis in social relations, and its varying successes. These 
conceptual insights necessitate seeing exercises of state power not as an outgrowth of 
will or the autonomy of state managers, but as the contingent product of a relationship 
of struggle and conflict between social forces and interests operating on the terrain of 
the state itself. While these insights provide the basis for an understanding of austerity 
as a political project, understood as the product of social forces and interests, rather 
than simply of the ascendance of ideas, ultimately this must be substantiated through 
empirical investigation. It is with this in mind that the thesis now turns to an 
examination of austerity in Australia under the Abbott government. 
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Chapter Two 
 
The Origins of Austerity: Class, Politics, and the State 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter traces the emergence of austerity as a political project in 
Australia following, and prior to the election of the Coalition in 2013. Where 
commentators have noted the continuity of neoliberalism in Australia, via the 
commitment of the Abbott government to neoliberal ideas (Aly 2014; Lloyd & 
Ramsay 2014/15; Swan 2014b), this chapter advances an alternate narrative. It argues 
that austerity can be explained with reference to the actions of the Australian state vis-
à-vis the process of political struggle in Australia. Particularly, rather than seeing 
events in Australian politics as driven primarily by ideas, it argues that the Coalition’s 
first Budget was the product of an uneasy, shifting, but nevertheless structurally 
powerful set of forces and interests operating on the terrain of the state. The aim is not 
to provide an exhaustive account of all those agents that can be linked to the 
formation of austerity, but merely to provide an introductory analysis to the political 
economy of austerity in Australia. First, the chapter will broadly trace key moments in 
the construction of an anti-state politics in Australia during the incumbency of the 
Australian Labor Party in the years following the global financial crisis. The 
emergence of this ‘anti-politics’ importantly had its foundation not just in particular 
coalitions or amalgams of interests, but in the movement of a broader, ‘popular’ set of 
forces. It is argued these provided a fundamental basis for the elaboration and 
articulation of a political project oriented to the promotion of capital accumulation via 
austerity. In light of the influence of these forces, the chapter will then consider the 
shaping of a more coherent austere project through the conjunctural and socio-
historical interrelation and interaction of capitalist and state forces that eventually 
coalesced in the 2014-15 Federal Budget. 
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The Crises of Labor and a Mandate for Austerity 
 
Though an important case could be made for tracing back the formation of 
austerity within a broader history of Australian capitalist development, there is little 
space to undertake such an analysis here. Instead, the main concern is to trace the 
conjunctural emergence of an austerity politics within the context of contemporary 
Australian neoliberal capitalism. Though a primary focus for this thesis is the actions 
of the Australian federal government and related institutions, this does not merely 
conflate the Australian ‘state’ with the Australian ‘government’. The Federal 
government constitutes but one institution, or institutional cluster, amongst a broader 
ensemble of state institutions, amongst which power is unevenly inscribed (Jessop 
1990: 341). On the articulation of government and state, Ralph Miliband (1969: 49) 
asserted that in advanced capitalist economies (like Australia) the state ‘cannot claim 
anything: only the government of the day, or its duly empowered agents, can’. This 
does not imply that the government totally controls the exercise of state power. 
However, as argued in Chapter One, the state is ‘anchored’, in part, in class relations. 
As a result, there remain central institutions – particularly the economic ministries – 
that operate as loci for the pursuit of class objectives (Bruff 2008: 8). It is on this basis 
that a study of the Australian Federal government, and even more specifically, the 
Federal Budgets produced and circulated by the Treasury and Department of Finance 
is warranted. As these departments, in addition to the Department of Prime Minister 
and Cabinet, are responsible for the development and co-ordination of economic and 
fiscal policies their role in promoting the development of Australian capitalism has 
been well noted (Catley 1996: 101; Pusey 1991: 81-2). While the Federal government 
far from constitutes the state in its entirety, the role of its core institutions, and their 
relations to societal forces make it a central focus for studying the emergence of an 
austerity politics in Australia’s recent history. 
 
Making the Crisis 
The introduction of austerity policies is frequently predicated on the existence 
of crises. Yet in Marxist analysis, crises are not merely considered the product of 
contingent historical, political, or economic developments. Crises also become 
manifest in the time and place that they do as ‘the product and the process of 
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struggle’ (Lichten 1986: 12, original emphasis). This is no less true when considering 
the basis for the formation, first of an anti-state politics, and then an austerity politics 
in Australia in the years following the financial crisis. Indeed, in the years leading up 
to the election of the Abbott government, the operation of federal politics was 
punctuated by crises. Initially these were largely political in nature, and arose due to 
developments surrounding the policy proposals of the former Labor government. The 
proposal in 2010, for instance, for a Resource Super Profit Tax (RSPT) – colloquially 
termed the ‘mining tax’ – devised so that Australia might better reap the profits of its 
mining boom were met with considerable resistance (Bell & Hindmoor 2014: 473; 
McKnight & Hobbs 2013: 307). In the face of a multi-million dollar campaign funded 
by mining corporations opposed to the RSPT, the Labor government was forced to 
revise their initial plans to a new Mineral Resources Rent Tax (MRRT). The MRRT 
was legislated only after considerable concessions were made to mining interests, and, 
as it would turn out, was largely ineffectual at raising revenue (Marsh, Lewis & 
Chesters 2014: 715-6; Swan 2014a: 246). In addition, proposals for a Carbon 
Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) to distribute emissions permits to polluting and 
trade-affected industries (Splash & Lo 2012, 72) – colloquially termed the ‘carbon 
tax’ – generated similar resistance. Over its various iterations – first the CPRS, then 
the Clean Energy Plan – the carbon tax faced considerable hostility. Indeed, the 
trajectory of public discourse over the tax soon gave rise to a public, ‘uncivil politics’ 
(Ward 2015), with active opposition and protest coming from a broad ‘grassroots’ 
social base, actively promoted by right-wing political and media figures (Swan 2014a: 
317). 
 
The mobilisation of social forces in opposition to various policy measures saw 
the production of a political crisis for (and of) the Australian Labor Party (ALP). In 
addition to the poor formulation, management, and reception of the ALP’s proposals, 
Labor suffered, as a result, significant internal divisions (Manne 2011: 78). Indeed, 
protests over both the mining and carbon taxes contributed to the development of 
internal leadership instabilities, which were to last for the remainder of Labor’s period 
in office. These divisions came to the fore particularly in three leadership challenges 
between Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard, two of which were successful. It was on this 
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basis that the claim could be made that the Labor Party was a party in crisis (Abbott 
2013b). 
 
Though these political instabilities helped to solidify distinct public and 
sectional opposition to Labor, they also provided a social base upon which a fiscal 
crisis could be constructed. Indeed, the sentiment that characterised protests against 
the Rudd-Gillard Labor governments was directed to the critique of the apparent creep 
of the state and politics into everyday life (see Ward 2015: 233-4). A base thus existed 
for the construction of a crisis that could be justified on a general suspicion of the 
state. In addition to Labor’s intrusions into the affairs of business, and their 
imposition of unpopular ‘taxes’, their costly spending programmes were purportedly 
crippling Australia’s future through the burden of debt (Hockey 2009, 2012). These 
narratives created the spectre of a ‘budget emergency’. Importantly, creation of this 
narrative of fiscal crisis did not just arise within the rhetoric of politicians. Its 
construction was similarly contingent upon the emergence and interaction of a range 
of forces and interests. It was only in the context of these political developments that 
the Coalition could claim upon their formation of government that they had been 
given a ‘mandate’ for comprehensive fiscal consolidation (Atkinson 2013). 
 
Never Let a (not-so) Serious Crisis Go to Waste 
In the context of these emerging crises, the coalition of interests involved in 
the struggle against the Australian state forged support for the pursuit of particular 
policy initiatives that favoured capital’s conjunctural interests. As discussed in 
Chapter One, the pursuit of such policy objectives cannot be understood as merely 
produced through ideational shifts external to the social relations of power in 
Australian capitalism. The rise of ideas such as austerity must be understood as 
conjuncturally contingent, emerging in response to material processes, and in their 
internal relation to enduring structural relationships. 
 
In this context, the eventual pursuit of austerity has its origins in the way in 
which capitalist interests were compelled into action through their confrontation with 
particular threats to the operation of capitalist accumulation. Indeed, the mobilisation 
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of those fractions of capital outlined above is reflected in former ALP Treasurer 
Wayne Swan’s memoirs. Swan (2014a: 365) laments: 
 
In the last couple of years, Australia has seen the emergence of our own distributional 
coalitions willing to use their considerable wealth to oppose good public policy and 
economic reforms designed to benefit the majority. 
 
This observation hints at the extent to which austerity was rooted in the strategies and 
struggle waged by these ‘distributional coalitions’. Indeed, as the previous chapter 
highlighted, austerity is better thought of as a political project advanced by the 
Australian state, insofar as the exercise of state power is the product of struggle and a 
balance of political forces. In the Australian context, struggle towards the exercise of 
state power in this manner has been strikingly evident. Indeed, the mobilisation of 
force opposing the mining tax was an attempt on the part of capital to secure their 
conjunctural interests through a confrontation with state forces. As scholars have 
noted, in this context state managers were relatively constrained in their capacity to 
exercise significant autonomy from such interests. Importantly, this was not simply 
because of the particularly public nature of the campaign, but also because of the 
inability of state managers to effectively counter the strategies advanced by those 
fractions of capital, manifest, for instance, in threats, whether believable or not, of 
divestment (Marsh, Lewis & Chesters 2014: 720-3). Considered in a broader sense, 
the victory of mining interests over plans to implement a tax on mining super-profits 
served not only to secure those profits for that individual industry, but also to reaffirm 
the power of capital in Australian society at large. This is, in essence, the sentiment 
that is echoed in Swan’s statement cited above. It is, then, in the context of this 
particular conjuncture that the turn to austerity has to be located. 
 
Indeed, the interaction of particular capitalist and state forces forged the social 
base from which austerity could begin to develop as a political project. In particular, 
attention ought to be paid in considering the crises of Labor, and the further 
construction of a fiscal crisis of the state, to the efforts of mining interests. Mining 
magnates Gina Rinehart and Andrew Forrest – Australia’s richest and fourth richest 
individuals – led a rally of approximately 2000 protestors in June 2010 against the 
mining tax (Taylor 2010). Moreover, Swan (2014a: 335-6) recalls a rather unorthodox 
meeting with Rinehart in May 2011: 
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I was booked to take a courtesy visit from Gina Rinehart in my electorate office … 
When she arrived I was surprised at the size of her entourage. What I thought was 
going to be a low key one-on-one turned into a large meeting with several important 
and serious foreign investors in tow … As it turned out, it was far from a courtesy 
call, with serious propositions for tax relief put on the table. It seemed the 
inappropriateness of this had not occurred to her at all. 
 
In addition, Clive Palmer, owner of the mining company Mineralogy, was elected to 
the Australian House of Representatives in the 2013 election, and was involved in the 
ultimate repeal of the MRRT (Cox, Massola & Hutchens 2014). In each case just 
described three powerful individuals representing particular capitalist interests 
actively engaged in an effort to neutralise a perceived threat to wealth. The interests 
that these fractions have thus advanced have been geared towards a removal of 
perceived state-imposed constraints on capital accumulation. Of course, the particular 
nature of reform targeted was not, at these points in time, geared towards austerity. 
However, the pursuit of tax repeal at one point and austerity at another can both be 
understood within the broader context of the ‘growth regime’ or model, pursued by 
the Australian state since the 1980s (Chester 2008). 
 
Indeed, tax repeal and fiscal austerity are consistent with one another, despite 
the fact that austerity is (nominally) aimed to reduce state deficits, which tax repeal 
often only exacerbates. If austerity is understood, however, as a political project, 
produced through a conjunctural balance of political forces operating on the terrain of 
the state, one begins to see the continuity inherent in seemingly contradictory fiscal 
stances. Amongst the core stated aims of proponents of austerity is that of restoring 
growth through cuts to growth-constraining public outlays. In this way, any 
(perceived) impediment to growth, such as a tax, will only serve to stymie the efforts 
of austerity measures (see Blyth 2013a: 39). The reason provided by the Abbott 
government for the repeal Labor’s taxes was precisely that these would impede 
economic growth by lowering incentives for business investment and capital 
expenditure (see Cox, Massola & Hutchens 2014).4 The removal of state-imposed 
barriers to the accumulation of capital in this way – reflective of the broader political 
economic struggles from which neoliberalism emerged – has been a recurring feature 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Incidentally, capital expenditure, particularly in the mining sector, has fallen despite the 
ultimate repeal of the tax (ABS 2015d). 
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of Australian economic policy since the 1980s (Chester 2008). Thus, despite the 
revenue to be derived from the mining and carbon taxes, it was claimed that, as a 
state-imposed barrier, they could only impinge upon growth. It is similarly along 
these lines that austerity measures are purported to enhance the incentives for the 
development of capitalist enterprise (Albo 1994: 147). In this context, austerity 
policies have the effect of promoting a mode of capitalist development, driven not by 
state oversight and redistribution, but by state enhancement of market forces.  
 
Thus, austerity falls under a particular set of policies advanced by particular 
social forces and interests ostensibly designed to enhance the competitiveness 
inherent in market relations. Indeed, there have been strong examples in which 
particular individuals representing particular fractions of capital have expressed 
support for austerity on precisely these terms. Take, for instance, this excerpt of an 
essay published by Gina Rinehart (2014: 6-7): 
 
Australia should never forget, if we want the multinationals to continue to invest their 
profits here, we have to put out the ‘welcome mat’ and provide good business reason 
why they should keep investing here … Australia needs to live within its means and 
reduce our budget deficit, and to do this also needs to enable investment and revenue 
from industry to grow. 
 
As discussed below, the austerity programme of the Abbott government has received 
other expressions of support from similar capitalist actors. These have had a more 
apparently visible impact on the actual formulation of the government’s programme. 
Yet the above discussion highlights that the formulation of austerity under the Abbott 
government became increasingly possible out of the (re)assertion, through drawing 
upon the opportunities presented by political economic crises, of a particular 
economic logic by certain material interests and social forces in Australian society. 
Australia was indeed, in the telling words of Tony Abbott (2014), ‘open for business’. 
 
Forging Coalitions 
In addition to the basis of support in particular fractions and representatives of 
capital, there was similarly an emerging popular sentiment regarding the economic 
role of the state. As discussed above, Labor’s carbon tax generated not only ‘elite’ 
political opposition, but also a form of grassroots, populist politics (Ward 2015). 
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Further, public support in general was falling sharply for Labor’s leadership 
throughout the course of these developments (McKnight & Hobbs 2013: 313-4). 
Indeed, support for core Labor government proposals such as the carbon and mining 
taxes was markedly divided. Over 2010-12 approximately 51 per cent of respondents 
to an Essential Media Communications poll (cited in Marsh, Lewis & Chesters 2014: 
719) supported the push for a tax on mining super-profits. Though this was a 
majority, around 29 per cent also expressed their disapproval, while the final 20 per 
cent were undecided. Public opinion on Labor’s carbon pricing scheme was also 
divided, with polls conducted over 2011-13 demonstrating 50 per cent opposed the 
legislation, with around 37 per cent in support and 13 undecided (Essential Media 
Communications 2013). Though these numbers by no means represent an unequivocal 
opposition to state involvement in the affairs of business, the marked division in 
public opinion highlights that the balance of political forces was not simply comprised 
of capitalist actors. Indeed, in a poll conducted after the release of the 2014-15 
Budget, 56 per cent of respondents believed that Australia was experiencing a ‘budget 
emergency’. Despite the Abbott government’s inability to effectively sell the first 
Budget, a year later 51 per cent remained committed to their belief in the existence of 
a fiscal crisis (Essential Media Communications 2015). While in both polls those 
responding doubted the Coalition’s ability to remedy the crisis, the narrative of crisis 
that required immediate remedial efforts, constructed by Coalition ministers, and fed 
in broader discourse by those like Rinehart (2014), thus had certainly gained some 
traction. Through the process of politico-ideological struggle, a coalition of forces and 
interests appeared to emerge between specific fractions of capital and sections of civil 
society. 
 
As examined above, Australia’s fiscal crisis was constructed. Labor did not 
accumulate substantial debt, if only in comparison to other developed economies, 
through frivolous public spending (see Stilwell 2014; The Australia Institute 2014). It 
was not just the Coalition, however, who conjured this spectre of a fiscal cataclysm. It 
was, and continues to be, a narrative propagated by business groups in Australian 
public discourse. In the years following the GFC, the Business Council of Australia 
(BCA), Australia’s peak business organisation, has published annual submissions to 
the government’s Federal Budget development process, warning that constraints 
27 
needed to be placed on the growth of state expenditure if the Australian economy was 
to avoid slipping into recession (BCA 2013: 3). This view echoes that position 
expressed by business leaders like Gina Rinehart, cited above, whose essay received 
extensive coverage (see Sexton 2014). In this vein, criticism has been not solely 
directly against the government itself, but also against those recipients of taxpayer 
largesse, who are seen to be a burden on Australia’s ascent to prosperity. This location 
of ‘freeloading’ individuals as the source of Australia’s ‘entitlement culture’ is a well-
rehearsed narrative. Indeed, it finds its formal expression in policy proposals, such as 
that put forward by the mining magnate Andrew Forrest, who advocated for a 
reduction in direct transfer payments and the establishment of a restrictive ‘welfare 
card’, stemming from an apparent need to control the consumption habits of welfare 
recipients (Forrest 2014: 27-9). While this is but one example, it is fundamentally 
these areas of fiscal policy that are seen to be core to the production of entitlement 
culture, and thus of fiscal crisis (Stilwell 2000: 214-5). As one commentator observed: 
 
The economic common sense peddled in contemporary Australia is that we are a 
high-taxing, high-spending, heavily indebted country burdened with terrible cost of 
living pressures and a welfare system that is too generous, and that something has to 
be done about it. (Wallace 2015) 
 
That many Australians, as cited above, believed in the existence of a ‘budget 
emergency’ seemingly offered some traction to Joe Hockey’s (2014c) words that we 
cannot ‘spend… money we don’t have’. However, though the narrative of a ‘budget 
emergency’ did find some traction in public sentiment, this hardly reflected clear 
acquiescence to austerity measures. The Abbott government, then, may have claimed 
to have a mandate for fiscal reform, but this mandate was not the unequivocal product 
of widespread popular support. The government’s programme, in the early stages of 
its inception, thus rested on an uneasy, but nonetheless powerful coalition of social 
forces and interests that were variously active in supporting and promoting austerity. 
 
Capital and the State in the Austere Turn 
 
While there was thus a social base upon which the Abbott government 
believed they could construct their programme, specific policies within the 2014-15 
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Budget itself were more directly the product of capitalist forces operating on the 
terrain of the state. The Australian federal government receives annual document 
submissions to the Budget development process from a number of organisations and 
interests on the nuances of fiscal policy. As noted above, since the GFC the 
submissions from the BCA in particular have argued for the necessity of ‘fiscal 
repair’, in the form of reductions to growth-constraining levels of public expenditure 
(see BCA 2010, 2011, 2013a). In fact, even a brief comparison of the submissions 
prepared prior to, or during the crisis with those published in the aftermath reveals an 
increasing sense of urgency over the need to control spending. The report prepared for 
the former Labor government in 2009, for instance, expressed a cautious acceptance 
of stimulatory fiscal policy: 
 
The Budget will almost certainly move into deficit at some point over the coming two 
years. The BCA considers this appropriate for the economic times. Running a deficit, 
however, is not an excuse for poor policy. Deficits should be clearly recognised as a 
temporary measure justified only in exceptional circumstances and which should not 
become ‘entrenched’. (BCA 2009: 1) 
 
This statement stands in contrast to one offered in the Council’s 2014-15 Budget 
submission: 
 
In the lead-up to this year’s budget there should be no disagreement [between the 
major political parties] on the fact that Australia has a serious fiscal problem that 
requires difficult trade-offs and decisions to be made in this and future budgets. (BCA 
2014: 3) 
 
Though broad, this latter report outlined an imperative to rein in fiscal expenditure in 
the 2014-15 Federal Budget. 
 
Furthermore, even prior to this ordinary submission, in December 2013 the 
BCA submitted a report to the government’s National Commission of Audit (NCOA), 
a temporary institution established by the Abbott government to review the various 
functions of the Commonwealth (BCA 2013b). This particular submission contains 
recommendations that can readily be interpreted as sowing the seeds of policies that 
eventually emerged in the 2014-15 Budget, such as proposals to reduce the value of 
subsidies provided to general practitioners for patient visits – that which came to be 
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the much maligned Medicare co-payment in the 2014-15 Budget (BCA 2013b: 20). 
Other 2014-15 Budget austerity measures, albeit in a rudimentary form, were also 
outlined by the BCA, such as cuts to welfare payments like ‘Newstart’ or family tax 
benefits (BCA 2013b: 18). Though broadly framed, the BCA’s submission to the 
Abbott government alluded to a variety of actual policy prescriptions, designed to 
serve the interests of capital through deficit reduction and, supposedly, the creation 
investment incentives. 
 
The influence of those organisations, like the BCA, in articulating the interests 
capital, or particular fractions of capital, should not be understated. While recent 
studies have cast doubt on the actual scope of the influence of the BCA, highlighting 
key problems with regards to the organisation’s administrative capacity to represent 
the ‘general will’ of its members (Bell 2006a, 2006b, 2008), these analyses largely 
fail to consider the BCA’s place within broader sets of social relationships. In terms 
of mediating the competing business interests of its members the BCA’s articulation 
of specific policy proposals that represent the ‘general will’ of its member companies 
may indeed be limited (see Jessop 1983: 159-60). However, as Cahill (2007: 228) has 
argued, in its interaction with the Australian state, the BCA is far from alone, forming 
but one of several pro-capital organisations. In this context, the BCA has historically 
been crucial in advancing the interests of capital, shaped within the terms of those 
broader accumulation strategies pursued by domestic and international capital through 
its interaction with the Australian state. 
 
The BCA’s role in promoting the conjunctural interests of capital must still be 
acknowledged today. For instance, to take a point of comparison, the Australian 
Council of Social Service (ACOSS) produced a report for the Abbott government’s 
Budget submission process, which expressed its reservations over a focus spending 
cuts, without sufficient consideration of the social purpose served by state expenditure 
(ACOSS 2014b: 3-5). The recommendations made in this submission were developed 
with the intention of strengthening the social welfare system, while suggesting 
alternative ways to reach surplus (ACOSS 2014b: 5-7). Yet, as ACOSS’s (2014a) 
analysis of the Budget following its release notes, these suggestions were ignored. 
Meanwhile, those of the BCA were embraced. In this sense, as argued in Chapter 
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One, the state can be seen as possessing a selective terrain in which the strategies of 
some social forces to access state power are asymmetrically favoured, due in part to 
the nature of the resources in their possession, over other forces and interests. In this 
sense, the words of former Prime Minister Abbott (2013a) underscore the importance 
attached to the thrust of the BCA’s arguments, over those offered by groups such as 
ACOSS: ‘I am confident that the BCA will continue to tell the Government what it 
should do: to repeal the carbon tax, to repeal the mining tax, to cut red tape and to get 
the Budget back under control’. 
 
The direct influence of capital interests on the formulation of the 2014-15 
Budget can be further explored by a consideration of the government’s Commission 
of Audit. As stated above, the Commission was a body established by the government 
to conduct an independent review of the functions of the Commonwealth. The Senate 
Select Committee into the Abbott Government’s Commission of Audit (hereafter 
‘Senate Select Committee’) (2014: 17) has argued, however, that the selection of 
Commissioners was ‘flawed’, as individuals appointed were seemingly chosen from 
only certain corners of the Australian community. Indeed, it was announced in 
October 2013 that the NCOA was to be chaired by Tony Shepherd, who was, at the 
time, the President of the BCA and chairman for the infrastructure management 
corporation Transfield Services (Hockey & Cormann 2013). As if to assure the 
absence of any conflict of interest, the preface of the Business Council’s submission 
to the NCOA states ‘[t]he Business Council of Australia has prepared the submission 
independently of the Commission of Audit and its chairman’ (BCA 2013b: 1, 
emphasis added). Simply declaring the independence of Shepherd’s position as 
chairman of the NCOA from his BCA associations does little to assuage any critical 
reader of the core interests represented at the heart of both the BCA’s report or the 
NCOA’s findings. While such actors may truly believe their interests represent those 
of broader society, the project they were advancing – due to their historical 
constitution as actors in a capitalist society (Konings 2010: 178) – was developed to 
promote capitalist interests. 
 
Thus, while ostensibly independent, the Commission and its members were 
crucial in advancing, through the state apparatus, a political project of austerity. 
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Despite being established to ‘review … the scope, efficiency and functions of the 
Commonwealth government’ (Hockey & Cormann 2013) in general, phase one of the 
report – the lengthier of two phases – was concerned exclusively with the expenditure 
side of Commonwealth responsibilities (NCOA 2014). Conspicuously absent from the 
Commission’s report was the issue of revenue, particularly those revenues ‘forgone 
through tax expenditures (amounting to around $115 billion in 2012-13)’ (Senate 
Select Committee 2014: 5). The seventh chapter of the report in particular contained 
fourteen sections, denoting fourteen areas of fiscal reform, many of which made their 
way into the Budget itself (NCOA 2014: 80-160). It is no secret that the NCOA 
heavily informed the development of the Budget, as the government established the 
Commission for that very purpose. What the case of the NCOA thus illustrates with 
striking clarity are the ways in which capitalist forces were socially and 
asymmetrically positioned to determine, or at least strongly influence Australia’s turn 
to fiscal austerity. 
 
Finally, attention must also be paid to the role of state managers when 
considering the origins of austerity. To point to the role played by class and other 
social forces is not to suggest that austerity has its origins only in the structural 
relations and lines of communication between state managers and certain elements of 
capital. As Miliband (1969: 50) stressed, those forces that operate within the state 
apparatus itself, and are ‘formally invested’ with the power to activate the capacities 
of the state, play a decisive role in the formulation of policies. More specifically, the 
autonomy of the state to act is in part relativised by those individuals themselves that 
at particular points in time occupy specific positions within the state apparatus (Jessop 
2012: 8). In this sense, some role must also be attributed to the incumbency of 
Coalition ministers. This is not to suggest a linear translation of the ideas or 
theoretical frameworks of ministers to political practice. Rather, it is to suggest that 
austerity is the product of the way in which different forms of social power come to 
find their expression in state activities. While we cannot ignore the actions of 
politicians and policymakers, it must also be recognised that these actors too are the 
products of social struggles and structures. As Konings (2010: 178) writes: 
 
[State] actors are themselves the product of the mode of socialisation of a capitalist 
society, even if their position demands that they respond to the problems generated by 
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social life as if they were external to that process … [T]heir historical constitution as 
actors in a capitalist society makes it likely that their epistemic framework will be 
biased in favour of capitalist interests. 
 
It is in this way that we might begin to develop a deeper understanding, so 
neglected in idealist accounts, of the way in which the idea of austerity gains traction 
in discourse and policy when it does. While the agency of strategically placed actors 
is important, explanations of political economic change and the exercise of state 
power cannot be reduced to such action. Members of the current Coalition 
government have frequently expressed their particular political dispositions within 
broader intellectual, economic frameworks. Tony Abbott, for instance, has aligned 
himself with orthodox economic notions, such as ‘[t]he challenge, everywhere, is to 
promote sustainable, private sector-led growth and employment – and to avoid 
government-knows-best action for action’s sake’ (Abbott 2014). Joe Hockey, as 
already noted above, has frequently expressed similar views (Hockey 2012, 2014a). 
Of course, the LNP more broadly is known to, in terms of Australia’s two major 
parties, declare the strongest commitment to the development of neoliberal economic 
policies that enhance ‘the interests of the capitalist marketplace’ (Stilwell 2000: 14; 
see also Hancock 2008). However, all this is not merely to suggest that the confluence 
of the stated ideology of politicians and capitalist interests is purely serendipitous. 
The ideological frameworks of politicians are both enabled and constrained by 
changing historical circumstances. 
 
Indeed, as this chapter has highlighted, the political project of austerity 
advanced by Abbott government was, in a sense, generated by the actions of forces 
operating on the terrain of the Australian state. Though such a project has been 
significantly critiqued, the specific context in which these forces were operating 
represented a particular moment in which austere economic ideas were able to gain 
some traction. In the wake of the GFC, states across the globe have sought to preserve 
the structures of modern neoliberal capitalism. Whether achieved through direct cuts 
in public expenditure, placing hopes of recovery in private enterprise (Blyth 2013a), 
or through providing liquidity to the operation of financial markets (Panitch 2014/15: 
9), such state action has been in response to the various imperatives created by 
definite forces, structures, and processes of struggle. In the Australian case, given the 
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long-standing philosophical base of the Coalition, then, the favouring of austere 
solutions is hardly surprising. But the interests of capitalists as well as the concerns of 
Coalition ministers are forged in the same process of historical development, and 
cannot thus be merely understood only with reference to such a philosophical base. 
The election of the Coalition in 2013 was, in an important sense, similarly 
conditioned by and predicated on the processes of struggle described in this chapter. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that the Abbott government’s austerity is the result of 
a political project fostered and promoted by a variety of social forces and interests 
interacting on the terrain of the Australian state. This historical account contrasts 
especially with ideational explanations of contemporary neoliberalism that stress the 
impact of ideas and economic theories, neglecting the forms of intervention 
undertaken by various forces and coalitions of interests within national and 
transnational political economies. The turn to austerity by the Abbott government in 
2014 had its immediate origins in particular moments of political action and 
intervention by representatives of the Australian capitalist class. The strategies 
advanced by these forces necessarily constrained the capacity of Labor’s state 
managers to activate the powers of the state. These events thus helped to construct the 
crises of the Labor government, and fuelled a growing civil unease over the role and 
purview of the state. While it is important not to overstate the degree to which there 
was a widely held public ‘consensus’, these movements within the balance of forces 
served as the base for which the Abbott government could claim a mandate, on the 
basis of a ‘fiscal crisis’, to implement ambitious austerity policies. These crises and 
shifts figured as a rationale for future austerity under a Coalition government. Indeed, 
following the 2013 elections, a more coherent austere project was developed through 
the actions and internalisation of particular fractions and representatives of Australian 
capital within the state apparatus. However, such a focus on political forces does not 
preclude a role for a study of ideology. As discussed in the next chapter, ideas and 
ideologies are similarly crucial to understanding austerity’s nature as a political 
project. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Selling Austerity: Economics, Ideology, and Interests 
 
 
Introduction 
 
It has thus far been argued that austerity measures in Australia form part of a 
political project, driven not solely by ideas but by certain material forces and interests. 
Yet this does not preclude the importance of ideas in such a project. As noted earlier, 
a common criticism of the Abbott government is its preoccupation with neoliberal 
ideology. Such characterisations, while suggestive, define ideology somewhat 
vaguely. This chapter argues that in conceiving of austerity as a political project 
shaped and advanced through social struggle, the way in which the Abbott 
government attempted (however unsuccessfully) to ‘sell’ austerity was indeed 
ideological. It is argued, however, that ideology must be understood as internally 
related to material structures and forces. In particular, this chapter argues that 
particular views advanced by the Abbott government contributed to the production of 
an over-arching narrative that austerity promotes the ‘common interest’. It is argued 
that this notion of a common interest, or ‘general will’ is ideological in virtue of the 
way it reifies particular experiences of reality and thus naturalises certain social 
relations of power and interest. It is this that highlights the nature of austerity as a 
political project, as, through ideological struggle, these narratives connect with, and 
advance the interests of those social forces involved in the broader struggle for 
austerity (Hall 1986: 42). The chapter first addresses the conflation of government 
and household debt, arguing that this narrative creates an illusory understanding of the 
state as merely another atomistic social actor, thereby masking its unique role within 
social and material relations more broadly. Next, nationalist narratives will be 
considered. The creation of nationalist sentiment in relation to austerity contributes to 
the production of an understanding that acting on state expenditure is integral to the 
preservation of the nation’s common wealth, and that this is in the interests of all. The 
third narrative considered here positions austerity as a matter of economic necessity, 
reinforcing the claim of the unquestionable imperative to act.  
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State and Household 
 
A narrative often referenced in contemporary debates over public debt 
compares the financial capacities of states with those of households. Prior to the 
election of the Abbott-led Coalition to office, Joe Hockey (2012) summed up this 
argument: ‘like a household, a nation needs to balance its budget over time and needs 
to make sure it can cover its future commitments’. Informed commentators, however, 
have argued that this amounts to an equivocation, as the capacities of states to manage 
their debts far exceed those of individual households (Jericho 2013; Smith 2014; 
Stiglitz 2000: 47). Yet the comparison is misleading on a further account. Indeed, it 
conflates the capacities and role of states more broadly – that is, not just financially – 
with those of households. Jessop (2008: 7) alludes to the dangers of this kind of 
conflation: 
 
For the state involves a paradox. On the one hand, it is just one institutional ensemble 
among others within a social formation; on the other, it is peculiarly charged with 
overall responsibility for maintaining the cohesion of the social formation of which it 
is merely a part. 
 
The assertion made by the Abbott government that public debt financing and 
government expenditure in Australian society is akin to household budget 
management invokes this paradox. As argued in Chapter One, the (Australian) state – 
of which the federal government is but a part – is charged with the management of a 
range of competing social forces and interests amongst which individual households 
fall. To equate the two confuses the vastly different responsibilities that each set of 
institutions is required to perform, particularly with regard to the state’s maintenance 
of the social relations of production. 
 
However, this is not necessarily just a case of poor rhetorical framing. Indeed, 
political elites elsewhere have made the same conflation on the basis of particular 
understandings of economics (see Kurtzleben 2013). Indeed, to assert the 
comparability of both a state’s and a household’s finances evokes a conceptualisation 
that can be found within neoclassical reviews of the role of the state, and that is 
further present within some neoliberal theory. Within neoclassical modelling, 
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expenses that accrue to individual households are managed vis-à-vis the circulation of 
money and commodities (more frequently termed ‘the circulation of income’), 
produced through the sale of labour-power – treated as a commodity – and other 
goods and services (Weeks 2012: 12-3). A similar understanding has been articulated 
within neoliberal theoretical tracts, in which households are conceptualised as 
producers and sellers of particular goods and services (Friedman 2002 [1962]: 13-4). 
The implication of this kind of analysis is that when expenses exceed the income 
circulated through and distributed between households, those in deficit must adjust 
their expenses accordingly. This incomplete, yet reasonably ‘common sense’ 
representation of debt often finds replication within academic analysis on state 
expenditure. During a time of recession there will be an increased strain on state 
spending, which may precipitate or exacerbate a shortfall in revenue. The implied 
responsibility of states during this time, as with households, is to find ways of cutting 
expenditure without recourse to the ‘easy’ political option of increasing debt levels, as 
this will lead, supposedly, to protracted recession (Hannesson 2015: 7). Equating state 
and household debt thus certainly has theoretical supports. 
 
However, equating the financial capacities and constraints of households and 
state has a role in naturalising certain social relationships. As discussed in Chapter 
One, austerity can, in this sense, be understood as ideological. On one hand, welfare 
payments made by contemporary capitalist states are designed to alleviate the 
inequalities generated by capitalist social relations (O’Connor 2009: 8). The cutting of 
state expenditures during a time of crisis is hardly akin to that of a household if only 
in virtue of the major networks of social groups that, during economic crises, rely on 
the largesse of public programmes. On the other hand, the argument that the state has 
the same financial responsibilities as a household belies the inscribed class 
selectivities of the state, as examined in Chapter Two of this thesis. Thus, portraying 
state responsibilities as akin to those of households reifies the state’s appearance as 
that which promotes the ‘general interest’ (see Jessop 2008: 9). This masks the 
unevenly felt benefits and pitfalls of austerity measures, which exist by virtue of 
austerity’s nature as a political project that advances the interests of some social 
forces over others. Analyses of the impact of the 2014-15 Budget, for instance, have 
illustrated that cuts to family tax benefits and healthcare subsidies would come at 
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significant expense to low-income households, particularly those with families. 
Indeed, by 2017-18 households containing a couple and children in the lowest income 
quintile would see their disposable income reduced as a result of these measures by 
6.6 per cent, or, in dollar terms, $2,780, while the disposable income of those in the 
top income quintile would increase by 0.3 per cent, or $478 (Phillips 2014: 13). These 
figures speak to the ideological nature of the comparison of household and 
government finances inherent in Coalition discourse, through its masking of the social 
character of the state. 
 
Though the Australian state advanced a political project that had the potential 
to produce unevenly felt economic consequences, state-household rhetoric effectively 
portrays the state’s role in Australian society as one characterised by the promotion of 
the ‘common interest’. That is, this narrative portrays the state as akin to individual 
households, no matter their social position, when the actual relation of the state to 
society is structured to selectively manage the inherently contested social 
relationships within which households are embedded. For the government to equate a 
state’s budget to that of a household is thus an expression of ideological legitimation. 
In portraying austerity, which serves some interests more than others, as that which is 
universally beneficial to all members of society, state managers employ ideology as a 
tool in the struggle to implement austerity – not on its merits, or lack thereof, as an 
economic idea, but through its basis as a political project that supports particular 
social interests over others. 
 
Austerity and Nationalism 
 
Not only has the Abbott government’s austerity been ideological in virtue of 
its portrayal of the state as neutral via the management of capitalism’s social relations, 
but also through the way in which the sale of austerity has been based on appeals to a 
‘national interest’. As an emerging field of scholarship details, neoliberal forms of 
political practice have never been strictly contained within a well-defined set of 
theoretical and ideational parameters. Instead, ‘[neoliberalism] feeds off, and draws 
energy and form from, its ideological foes and forebears’ (Peck 2008: 4). It was with 
such an elective mix of ideas, most notably those associated with appeals to the 
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nation, that Abbott and his ministers also attempted to legitimise austerity. Indeed, the 
Australian state has frequently attempted to manufacture consent for particular 
political economic projects through the construction of an Australian nationalism 
(Kuhn 2005: 10-3). In particular, the discourses employed to this effect have drawn 
upon a lineage of nationalist sentiment, which broadly finds its expression as a form 
of Australian exceptionalism. That is, Australia’s nationalism has frequently been 
structured around the notion that Australians possess fundamentally different qualities 
to the people of other nations, and that this apparent uniqueness is key to the country’s 
successes (Kuhn 2005: 10-1). For instance, former Liberal Prime Minister John 
Howard stated in 2001 that ‘[t]here is something special about being an Australian… 
That Australian spirit, that capacity, that mateship that allows us to pull together in 
times of challenge and times of adversity that is something very special’ (Howard 
cited in Kuhn 2005: 10). 
 
It is a similar narrative that LNP politicians constructed to sell austerity 
measures. In his 2014-15 Budget night speech, former Treasurer Joe Hockey argued 
that inaction on curbing the growth of public expenditure would soon see the 
government’s debt become unmanageable. In the coda to this well-rehearsed 
narrative, rather than substantiating this economic argument, Hockey sought to derive 
legitimacy by invoking a nationalist sentiment. The former Treasurer stated that ‘As 
Australians, we must not leave our children worse off. That’s not fair. That is not our 
way. We are a nation of lifters, not leaners’ (Hockey 2014b, emphasis added). Similar 
sentiments, attempting to intertwine the need for economic action with an Australian 
uniqueness, are to be found echoed by class actors as well as state managers. 
Rinehart’s essay attacking Australia’s growing ‘culture of entitlement’, for instance, 
pointed to Australia’s unique position in the world as evidence of why the state should 
not continue to squander the country’s future through the accumulation of debt 
(Rinehart 2014: 5). At this point it is clear that the construction of Australian 
nationalist sentiments has an ideological quality. As Kuhn (2005: 9) writes: 
 
Capitalists and their favourite thinkers, publicists and spokespeople are not shy about 
identifying their own interests with those of the entire society or about inventing and 
promoting ideas that dispute or obscure the significance of class … Some such 
ideologies and the activities that go along with them create ‘imagined communities’ 
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and illusory social contradictions, between people understood to be members of such 
a community and those deemed to be outside it. 
 
It is in this way that, through appeals to nationalism, austerity is presented as a 
political project. Tasked with the role of mediating the inherently conflicting interests 
of a diverse range of social forces, state managers must try to build some degree of 
unity around their actions if they are to be perceived as legitimate (Jessop 2008: 37). 
To this end, nationalism is offered as a cohesive force. However, selling austerity 
through appeals to a uniquely Australian character reifies the social relations that are 
assumed to exist between citizens in virtue of these shared characteristics. The result 
of this reification is the conflation of the interests and character of each citizen with 
that of the nation in general. In this sense, austerity is ideological through its creation 
of an ‘imagined community’; a group that is held to share certain transhistorical 
characteristics that ultimately unite more than those that divide (Kuhn 2005: 10-3; see 
Anderson 1991 [1983]). Austerity’s justification through nationalism connects with 
the narratives advanced by particular social forces, who similarly purport that their 
interests represent the interests of the Australian ‘nation’ (see Rinehart 2014). In this 
way, the Abbott government contributed to the struggle to advance a political project 
underpinned by austerity, which, through the exercise of state power, advances the 
interests of the Australian capitalist class, or representatives thereof. 
 
‘Magic Pudding’ Economics 
 
The Abbott government also offered a third, economistic narrative to sell their 
austere programme. One notable way in which this has been conveyed has been 
through the invocation of the classic Australian story of the Magic Pudding by 
Norman Lindsay. The reference within recent Australian political debate has referred 
predominantly to the titular character of the tale, a pudding that, upon being 
consumed, magically replenishes itself; a potent, if politically charged metaphor for 
the national welfare state (Eipper 1999: 194-5). What this allegorical reference has 
entailed is a particular representation of the economy that reconfigures its relationship 
to its politico-ideological features. The magic pudding analogy has been employed as 
a means by which Coalition ministers have criticised the transferral of welfare 
‘entitlements’ and government largesse to the Australian population, at the expense of 
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private, profit-oriented solutions (Hockey 2009). As Finance Minister Mathias 
Cormann (2015) stated: ‘there is no magic pudding … [I]f we spend more on one area 
in our Budget, we’ve got to spend less on another area … because otherwise we 
would be adding to the deficit’. While references to the pudding may be a mere 
rhetorical device, arguments of this kind effectively frame the Coalition’s austerity 
measures as unquestionable economic ‘common sense’, rather than that which is 
politically driven. This, of course, belies the way in which austerity in Australia, as a 
political project, was actively supported through the actions of particular social forces, 
including fractions and representatives of capital operating through the state 
apparatus.  
 
Yet, by virtue of its rejection of political alternatives, the Coalition’s ‘magic 
pudding’ argument is a form of (neoliberal) ‘politics that expressly denies its political 
character’ (Peck & Tickell 2002: 400). The framing of austerity in Australia in this 
sense has evoked the Thatcherian dictum that ‘there is no alternative’ (see Massey 
2015: 105). It was perhaps in part due to the creation of this pervading sense of 
necessity that argumentation for austerity, or the addressing of its historical failures 
could be substantially avoided. Indeed, neither the Budget document itself, nor 
Hockey’s speech following its release put forward a clearly articulated argument for 
austerity on economic grounds – save for its insurmountable necessity – that 
addressed criticisms levelled at the neoclassical conceptualisation of public spending 
underpinning it (Blyth 2013a: 8-10). Hockey’s (2012) speech at the Institute of 
Economic Affairs in London briefly raised the neoclassical ‘crowding out’ thesis; the 
argument that government spending reduces private investment, weakening economic 
growth (Bougrine 2000b: 1). He argued that ‘a lower level of entitlement means 
countries are free to allow business and individuals to be successful’ (Hockey 2012). 
In rejecting such an assumption, analysts have pointed to the ways that government 
financing can actually contribute to, rather than detract from private sector investment 
(Bougrine 2000a: 16-7). Nonetheless, Hockey’s statement hardly stands on its own as 
a rigorous and empirically defended argument for fiscal consolidation. Thus, the 
claim of necessity has an altogether more curious quality. As Massey (2015: 105) 
argues, a striking development over the past few decades has been the removal of ‘the 
economic’ from ‘the sphere of politico-ideological contestation’. Yet this 
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development is paradoxical, at least in the present case. At the same time that ‘the 
economic’ has become pre-eminent, the rigorous defence of economic policy by those 
who are responsible for its implementation has been scarce. Without providing a 
nuanced and elaborated argument, state managers shield themselves from critiques 
that directly interrogate the logic and substance of the policies they are advocating. 
 
However, it is in this sense, perhaps above all, that the selling of austerity has 
been ideological. The seemingly common sense notion that we cannot spend more 
than we have is certainly, as Blyth (2013a: 10) puts it, ‘seductive in its simplicity’. 
Furthermore, this notion is embedded within neoliberal discourses about the alleged 
‘neutrality’ of money. Put simply, from the perspective of austerity’s proponents, ‘it is 
precisely because money is nothing in and of itself that there is a tremendous danger 
in attributing inherent powers to it’ (Konings 2013: 130). This particular argument, 
however, entails an ideological manoeuvre. This is not a novel critique. Scholars have 
noted the ideological nature of austerity in precisely these terms, as austere 
programmes have reared their heads across the globe since the GFC. Yet austerity in 
this form appears as a political project that is designed to embed institutional practices 
and logics that serve the interests of particular social forces. 
 
The precise character of this ideological formation has not often been fully 
appreciated. Massey (2015: 105), for instance, sees the way in which austerity is 
ideological as somewhat distinct from material structure. As examined in Chapter 
One, this type of perspective fails to acknowledge the way in which ideological 
formations are themselves mechanisms through which particular social relationships 
are reproduced (or challenged); that is, it fails to note the ‘material structure of ideas’ 
(Bieler 2006: 78-9). The rise of austerity in Australia, as argued in the previous 
chapter, was closely tied to the various activities of invested social forces. Its sale by 
the Abbott government has thus been ideological because of the way that it presents 
economic imperatives as though they were eternal laws, abstracted from the material 
context in which such imperatives emerge. The reification of these ideas, which 
emerge and gain traction through the process of struggle, advance austerity as a 
political project through upholding and reproducing the dominance of those forces 
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that were active in its making, and, at the same time, obscures their role and interest in 
this process.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has extended the argument that the Abbott government’s austerity 
programme can be accurately conceived of as a political project, by highlighting the 
ways in which its formulation is founded upon masking austerity’s inherent class 
nature. In particular, this chapter considered three ‘selling points’ that have been 
advanced in attempts to secure the passage of austerity measures through Parliament. 
These did not reflect just a commitment to the prescriptive logics of neoliberalism, but 
rather served as legitimising narratives that obfuscated the involvement and 
implication of those social forces and interests integral to the development of the 
Budget itself. It is in this sense, above all, that we might characterise the Abbott 
government’s agenda as ideological. The comparison established between state debt 
and household debt has cast the former as an independent, atomistic actor in broader 
society. However, this obscures the ‘sui generis reality’ (Isaac 1987: 155) of the state 
as that which is engaged in the management and reproduction of existing social 
relations of power. At the same time, the invocation of a nationalist sentiment 
attempts to unify those disparate interests that are so unevenly served by the 
implementation of austerity policies. Finally, the third narrative considered here – that 
which evokes the notion of the economic imperative – arguably plays the most 
significant ideological role, if only in virtue of the fact that it obscures the role played 
those specific forces discussed in the previous chapter that were so integral to the 
formulation of austerity under the Abbott government. In light of this investigation it 
is evident that the Australian state, and state managers in particular, have been 
integral, through the construction of ideological narratives, to the advance of austerity 
as a political project. Yet their actions have been more encompassing than that of 
merely masking the power asymmetries that are reproduced through the 
implementation of austerity. It is to a study of the broader actions of the Australian 
state in advancing austerity as a political project, that this thesis now turns. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Austerity and State Power: Waxing or Waning? 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In developing the argument that the austerity programme introduced by the 
Abbott government is a primarily a project designed to enhance the power of capital 
interests at the expense of other social forces, previous chapters have focused on the 
central role that the state has played in the construction and advance of this project. 
Extending the discussion of this point, this chapter demonstrates the misleading nature 
of claims that austerity produces a waning or attenuation of state power. In this light, 
many accounts are thus blind to the way in which exercises of state power – due to the 
state’s (contested and variable) constitution as a ‘factor of cohesion’ (Jessop 1982: 16-
20) and object of conflict within capitalist society – remain central to the maintenance 
and promotion of capitalist socio-economic arrangements, strategies, and projects. 
 
This chapter therefore argues that austerity in Australia, insofar as it is a 
political project advanced by particular social forces, requires particular forms and 
patterns of state action. First, the chapter briefly chronicles the forms of opposition 
that the Abbott government faced in implementing austerity. It discusses two 
prominent campaigns that emerged to oppose the Abbott government, and points to 
the role of the state in managing these social forces. Second, it is argued that the 
deployment of particular policy tools in line with the narrative of ‘fiscal 
sustainability’ demonstrates the way in which the state has remained integral to the 
promotion of the austerity project. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of 
the Abbott government’s second Federal Budget. It is argued that, in contrast to 
characterisations of this Budget as an expression of a politically pragmatic turn in 
fiscal policy (Coorey 2015; Smyth 2015), an austere logic persists. This does not 
merely suggest a stubborn commitment to an austere fiscal strategy. Rather, it is 
argued that austerity persists in light of the state’s role in promoting and securing 
conditions conducive to capitalist development. 
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Resisting Austerity 
 
As has been noted, the Abbott government faced a significant degree of 
opposition from a wide array of forces to the implementation of austerity measures. 
Arguably this opposition began to crystallise in the nation-wide ‘March in March’ 
protests that occurred prior to the delivery of the first Budget. While at this stage the 
specifics of the Budget were unclear, the concerns of participants were directed 
towards suspected cuts to federal funding arrangements to areas such as health, 
education, and welfare (Lillebuen 2014; Maley 2014). While similar protests 
continued to occur throughout the government’s incumbency they provoked little 
reaction, aside from Abbott’s claimed ignorance of their existence (Laughland 2014). 
Ignorance could not so readily be expressed, feigned or otherwise, for those other 
forms of opposition that emerged after the release of the 2014-15 Budget. 
 
The AMA and Medicare 
Where the ‘March in March’ rallies may have been lacking a clearly defined 
social base, the forms of protest that emerged upon the release of the Coalition’s first 
Budget had very specific constituencies. Indeed, the government faced a number of 
targeted campaigns that aimed to tackle the evident biases contained in the 2014-15 
Budget. One such campaign was that undertaken by health organisations, most 
notably the Australian Medical Association (AMA), which announced public 
opposition to the government’s original proposals for Medicare reform, as well as 
subsequent policy iterations (Gardner 2015; Rollins 2014). Once the government’s 
health reforms had been subject to sufficient scrutiny, revealing their devastating 
distributional impact on the working class and unemployed (Harrison et al. 2015), 
members of the Senate became the targets of lobbying efforts to block passage of the 
government’s plans. Polling figures further indicate that the proposals found little 
support within the broader Australian population, with only 27 per cent of 
respondents supporting the government’s measures (Essential Media Communications 
2014a). The AMA played a role in organising such opposition. In attempts to curb the 
levels of federal funding for Australia’s Medicare system, the government introduced 
changes to the bulk-billing system, based on the duration of visits to general 
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practitioners. Under the proposed new arrangements, consultations that previously 
attracted a rebate of $37.05 were to see this payment reduced to $16.95. The AMA 
was involved in the framing of this new measure as an effective cut of $20.00, far 
more devastating than the original proposal for a $7.00 rebate cut. Through its actions 
the AMA eventually secured a position at the negotiating table with the government’s 
health minister, Sussan Ley, and so consolidated its potential to shape the future 
direction of Australia’s Medicare system (Russell 2015). 
 
However, the incorporation of the AMA into a consultation process with the 
Coalition should not been interpreted as signalling an overturning of the Australian 
state’s austere approach to healthcare. Instead, it stands as an instructive example of 
the way in which the government drew on state powers to manage opposition to its 
agenda of reconfiguring the character of accumulation in Australia. As Bundey (2014) 
argues, changes to Medicare, if the reform packages were implemented, would 
contribute to an increasingly financialised Australian health system. That is, they 
would serve to further integrate households into a system of exposure to the risks 
inherent in financial markets, while entrenching a broader movement towards the 
accumulation of capital through such markets (Bundey 2014: 69-70; see also Bryan, 
Martin & Rafferty 2009: 462). Yet the decision to include the AMA in talks for health 
‘reform’ has been lauded as a crucial and progressive step in softening the shape new 
reforms would eventually take (Owler 2015). More especially, though the government 
had initiated a consultation process, health measures that were opposed by the AMA 
were still in place to be implemented. Though the more prominent reforms such as the 
$7.00, and then $5.00 co-payments were scrapped, the freeze on indexation rates for 
Medicare payments remain, at the time of writing, as part of government policy 
(Harrison et al. 2015: 313).5 This measure, according to Parliamentary Budget Office 
(2015: 2) projections, would save around $1.2 billion just between the years 2015-16 
and 2018-19. These savings would come at the expense of general practitioners who 
in turn could opt to pass these costs on to their patients, which Harrison et al. (2015: 
315) suggest could be as much as a $8.43 per non-concessional patient (or 7.1 per 
cent of rebate income) by 2017-18.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The time of writing is October 2015. 
46 
Furthermore, whilst the AMA is the peak representative body of the Australian 
medical profession, only around 40 per cent of general practitioners are members. As 
Russell (2015) notes, the organisation’s capacity to bargain for better conditions for 
all doctors and patients is thus limited. Nonetheless, the way in which the government 
was able to integrate the AMA into a negotiation process has appeared to partially 
mollify some of the dissenting voices amongst the medical fraternity. What this 
suggests is that, rather than wholly retreating from an austere project, opposition 
forced the Abbott government to manage and configure this social resistance in such a 
way that permitted it to continue its austere policy track. This has been far from an 
easy accord between the state and the AMA, with subsequent changes in government 
policy – such as the introduction of a Medicare services review (Hyland 2015) – again 
triggering a new bout of resistance. Nonetheless, what this case demonstrates is that 
the state has thus sought to manage and accommodate the opposition that has arisen in 
regards to healthcare, but that this has not entailed a substantial retreat from austere 
policy in healthcare. 
 
Student Protests and Tertiary Reform 
The government has also faced a significant degree of resistance from student-
based organisations and tertiary-education unions reacting to proposed changes to 
higher education. Of all movements opposing the Abbott government, student protests 
have been the most public and publicised. Students flooded the streets on numerous 
occasions, blockaded events involving Coalition MPs, and staged a televised protest 
on a prominent current affairs programme (Ireland 2014; Lusted 2015; National 
Union of Students 2015). Student opposition was aligned with broader public 
sentiment, with polls indicating that the 20 per cent cut to university course funding, 
amounting to around $1.9 billion (Griffiths 2015), coupled with the deregulation of 
course fees, were amongst the most unpopular of the Coalition’s policies (see 
Essential Media Communications 2014a, 2014b). The widespread unpopularity and 
an obstinate Senate crossbench have meant that education reforms, since Abbott’s 
demise from the prime ministership in September 2015 and the subsequent Cabinet 
reshuffle, the new Education Minister Simon Birmingham has temporarily ‘shelved’ 
proposals for reform of tertiary education (Anderson 2015). 
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Such a retreat is hardly surprising; yet there is not likely to be any substantial 
or overall change to a Turnbull government’s programme. Such an understanding is 
prompted by the nature of Birmingham’s claims that ‘higher education funding 
arrangements for 2016 will not be changed from currently legislated arrangements 
while the government consults further on reforms for the future’ (Birmingham cited in 
Anderson 2015, emphasis added). Indeed, calls from the vice-chancellors of 
Australia’s leading universities, which lauded the Abbott government’s initial reforms 
(Group of Eight 2014), remained that, despite the failure of initial proposals, 
significant structural adjustment of tertiary education is required (Knott 2015; 
Macdonald 2015). However, if such new reforms are to take, more or less, the shape 
that failed proposals have, this would not reveal a continued commitment to the 
withdrawal of the state from involvement in markets. On the contrary, it would 
provide a clear example of state action to secure new spaces for the accumulation of 
capital. While previously existing deregulation proposals were an example of the 
state’s active marketisation of the tertiary education sector (Ryan forthcoming), cuts 
to course funding would have worked alongside this reform by forcing universities to 
recover their costs through increasing fees. It was projected that the (now shelved) 
cuts would have forced at least a 30 per cent increase in course fees to cover lost 
funding (Pash 2014). Considering the desire expressed by the Turnbull government is 
to ensure Australian universities remain internationally (and domestically) 
‘competitive’ (Anderson 2015), it is unlikely any future reforms will be radically 
different from those already rejected. Though the capacities of the Australian state 
may change with these reforms, rather than seeing such reforms as a ‘small state’, 
‘free market’ policy, cuts to funding, coupled with university deregulation ought to be 
understood as representing a deepening commitment to the exercise of state power in 
extending and cementing the values and relations of markets into the organisation of, 
in this case, the sphere of higher education. 
 
Generational Accounting as Political Project 
 
A continued commitment to an austere project is also evident in the nature of 
the particular policy tools employed by the federal government. The use of 
generational accounting – in the form of Commonwealth Intergenerational Reports 
48 
(IGRs) – builds on the narrative of fiscal sustainability, allegedly demonstrating the 
need for further fiscal prudence. Intergenerational reports are produced by the 
Australian government every five years, and offer forty year projections into the state 
of the nation’s demographic and economic development (Commonwealth of Australia 
2015a: vii; Gruen & Spender 2012: 328). Though they are reports rather than policy 
documents, they are nonetheless crafted with political intent. Since their first use in 
Australia in 2002, these reports have been used to frame particular state projects 
(Gruen & Spender 2012: 328-9). In particular, the nature of these reports lends 
themselves well to the construction of a particular narrative around fiscal 
sustainability, and the ‘myth of a looming fiscal crisis’ (Watts 2012). Yet, as Watts 
(2012: 91-2) illustrates, the conclusions drawn from this kind of intergenerational 
accounting invariably point to the inevitable unsustainability of the current fiscal track 
and the need for measures to curb the growth of government expenditure. However, 
this is far from a forgone conclusion. As Richard Denniss (2012: 2) of The Australia 
Institute writes: 
 
Anyone interested in understanding the likely consequences of a 2 per cent spike in 
GDP growth on government tax revenue should consult an economic modeller, but 
anyone interested in knowing what will happen to the Australian economy in 20 [or 
more] year’s time should probably ask an astrologer. 
 
Despite its jocular tone, this claim nonetheless echoes important concerns that 
have been raised by scholars. In particular, crucial problems arise in the kinds of 
modelling contained in the IGR. The very nature of these reports assumes a certain 
constraint to levels of government debts and deficits, relative to GDP, and a negative 
ascription of growth in government expenditure over time, if only, in this case, 
because it places greater burdens on future generations (Watts 2012: 95). Others have, 
however, pointed out that ‘there is no magic deficit-to-GDP ratio or debt-to-GDP ratio 
that ought to be maintained or avoided’ (Wray cited in Watts 2012: 93). A second 
problem lies in the econometric methods employed to calculate the trajectory of 
demographic and economic change, in that they are largely unable to account for the 
existence of an ontologically ‘open’ system (Lawson 1997: 67), in which future 
uncertainties –changes in government policy, or the onset of crises – fundamentally 
render dubious at best any long-term predictions and modelling (Bessant, Emslie & 
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Watts 2011: 145; Galbraith, Wray & Mosler 2009: 19-21). Thus, what is calculated is 
akin to that which Beckert (2013) has termed ‘imagined futures’. 
 
It is not difficult to recognise the way in which these forms of modelling so 
readily contribute to the promotion of a narrative of fiscal sustainability, and thus the 
advance of an austere political project. If debts and deficits are held to cause 
economic problems and inefficiencies, and the methods for estimation are made with 
a static view of budgetary accounting, austerity now, rather than later, seems the only 
viable solution (Watts 2012: 88). The use of these accounting tools thus speaks to the 
role of the state in advancing austerity as a particular political project. That these 
assumptions are fairly commonplace features of orthodox economic analysis means 
that it is hardly surprising when the underlying elements of state budgetary decisions, 
such as class relations, are ignored. As O’Connor (2009: 8) argues, capitalist state 
expenditures are constituted by contradictory imperatives, where expenditures that 
promote the accumulation of capital generate the need for ‘social expenses’, such as 
welfare, to address the problems generated by such accumulation. All budgetary 
measures like austerity thus differentially impact particular groups, as such measures 
develop, at least in part, as a result of the state’s role in promoting capitalist 
development and managing its social contradictions (O’Connor 2009: 6). 
 
Such a statement should hardly be controversial for political economists and 
other critical scholars. Yet, as argued in Chapter One, a central problem that arises in 
ideas-centred accounts is explaining the concrete links between the choice of 
particular policies and the social interests they serve. It is thus not a sufficient critique 
– though it is necessary – that particular policy tools, like Australia’s IGRs, which 
foster the narrative of fiscal crisis, offer misleading representations of the nature and 
trajectories of public expenditure. Rather, the narrative of fiscal sustainability that is 
developed through such reports fundamentally sustains class interests as it promotes 
austerity for those social expenses that, as O’Connor details, develop out of the very 
process of state-supported capitalist development. The state thus operates in a 
contradictory way, but one that is nonetheless structured by capitalist imperatives. 
 
50 
This principle of state action can be seen in relation to the federal 
government’s 2015 IGR, in which health expenditure figures prominently in terms of 
narratives of fiscal sustainability. Indeed, the implicit analysis within the IGR 
indicates the way in which the Australian state has attempted to impose austerity to 
shape the conditions that are suited to particular strategies of accumulation. In this 
respect, it is important to note the way in which the very structure of the 2015 IGR 
contains projections solely based on federal-level, or Commonwealth fiscal 
sustainability, as opposed to a comprehensive review inclusive of state- and territory-
government accounts (Gruen & Spender 2012: 329). In this way, policies that entail 
the devolution and dispersion of responsibility or expenses to different, typically 
lower levels of governance within the ensemble of state institutions (see Jessop 2002: 
454), are not included in the report’s projections into the sustainability of fiscal 
expenditure. 
 
The case of health funding provides an instructive example. In 2014-15 the 
Commonwealth was budgeted, in accordance with existing Commonwealth-state 
agreements, to transfer $46.3 billion to the states as specific purpose payments, of 
which health costs accounted for $16.4 billion (Duckett 2015). However, the 2014-15 
Federal Budget put measures in place that would cease these arrangements, thereby 
substantially reducing Commonwealth contributions to state health provision (Duckett 
2014). Government figures estimated that the cessation of these agreements, coupled 
with curbing the growth of payments through changed indexation arrangements, 
would save $1.8 billion over four years, beyond which (likely) substantial further 
savings are not projected (Commonwealth of Australia 2014a: 126). The impact of 
these changes to the Commonwealth’s fiscal expenditure is reflected within IGR 
projections, where, as Duckett (2015) notes, the savings are incorporated into the 
current trajectory of legislation. However, the IGR paints a distorted picture of these 
budgetary savings. As those payments that have been curbed form part of state 
government budgets for health, these governments must increasingly find a solution to 
their sudden shortfall in funding (Duckett 2015). Overall expenses have not 
necessarily been reduced, merely rearranged. 
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The new health funding arrangements not only illustrate the way in which the 
state remains central in economic arrangements, but the way in which its patterns of 
action are determined by the influence of capitalist imperatives and processes. While 
the implications that will flow from the transfer of fiscal responsibility are not clear, 
in general terms these policies will shape future conditions of service provision. 
Considering the fiscal gap, for instance, to be borne by state governments, the 
increased costs of healthcare may be transferred to individual users (Duckett 2014). 
Furthermore, the dispersion of responsibility amongst state institutions within the 
ensemble merely alters and rescales the modes and patterns of state intervention. 
Indeed, devolving and rescaling state capacities impacts the strategic position of those 
state institutions now responsible for service management in their relationship to 
competing forces and interests (Jessop 2002: 454). That is, the increased strain on 
state and territory government finances as a result of the transfer of costs will 
potentially influence the nature and selectivity of the terrain upon which strategies can 
be advanced by capitalist forces in the interests of accumulation. What form these 
forces and strategies may take, and when and whether they will arise remains to be 
seen. Regardless, rather than seeing the state retreating in any real sense, austerity has 
entailed the advancement of state action oriented to the promotion of conditions that 
sustain continued capitalist development. 
 
A State of Continuity: The 2015-16 Federal Budget 
 
Through a politics of austerity the state is not ‘reduced’ in terms of its 
enduring role in creating and configuring the extra-economic conditions necessary for 
the accumulation of capital. This role should always be viewed, however, in the 
context of prevailing state strategies for the promotion of capitalist development. 
These insights make especially problematic those revised characterisations of the 
Abbott government that emerged following the release of the 2015-16 Budget in May 
2015, which saw the introduction of new spending measures designed to incentivise 
business growth and workforce participation. Claims that the policy measures 
introduced in this document reflected a pragmatic turn in the face of resistance sorely 
misrepresented the nature of new government arrangements as ‘stimulatory’ and even 
‘Keynesian’ (Coorey 2015; Fensom 2015; Smyth 2015). Austerity measures 
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continued to underpin the new Budget, but within a broader host of policy measures, 
which advanced a political project aimed to promote the interests of capital. 
 
A centrepiece of the 2015-16 Budget was the ‘Jobs and Small Business 
Package’. Though yet to be legislated, it would reduce the rates of taxation levied 
against small businesses, and also grant these businesses an asset tax ‘write off’ of up 
to $20,000 on new purchases, which, taken together, would come at an approximate 
cost of $5.5 billion the Federal Budget (Commonwealth of Australia 2015b: section 1-
10). However, new, extended, and yet-to-be legislated cuts to services and 
programmes would more than recover the amount this package was projected to cost, 
as the 2015-16 Budget does nothing to reverse the already existing proposals for 
changes to the Australian public sector. For instance, in addition to the cuts of $7.6 
billion to foreign aid that were proposed and implemented in the 2014-15 Budget, the 
2015-16 Budget confirmed a further cut to the sector of $3.7 billion over three years 
that was originally proposed in the 2014-15 Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook 
(MYEFO) (Medhora 2014, 2015). Changes during 2014 to the government’s original 
plan for a Paid Parental Leave Scheme, which saved the Commonwealth coffers $1.6 
billion over the forward estimates (Commonwealth of Australia 2015b: section 1-8), 
have been supplemented by 2015-16 Budget savings measures that withdraw 
government-funded parental leave benefits from those whose employer offers a more 
generous scheme; the so-called removal of ‘double-dipping’, expected to save 
approximately $1 billion (Commonwealth of Australia 2015b: section 1-15; Mather 
2015). Further significant savings are to stem from stricter conditions for welfare 
recipients, and changes to the assets test threshold for pensioners. These are expected 
to save $1.5 billion and $2.4 billion respectively (Commonwealth of Australia 2015b: 
sections 1-15, 3-21). There were thus significant savings that underpinned those new 
forms of spending in the 2015-16 Budget. 
 
However, though this points to the fact that the government had not totally 
abandoned an austere fiscal strategy, it tells us little how austerity served the interests 
of its supporters. Morover, austerity should not be understood, particularly with 
regard to the state’s role in promoting accumulation, but in relation to the particular 
political strategy of which it forms but a part. Another prominent feature of the 2015-
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16 Budget – family and childcare policy – provides an instructive example. New 
arrangements in childcare payments are intended to provide greater support to low to 
middle-income families (Commonwealth of Australia 2015b: section 1-12). While 
these payments have largely been considered to be core to the government’s new 
spending arrangements, this characterisation paints a distorted picture. Certainly, 
these measures, expected to cost $4.4 billion, appear to increase childcare assistance 
to families (Whiteford & Nethery 2015). Yet the government expect this package to 
be paid for through those changes to family welfare proposed in the 2014-15 Budget. 
Reforms such as the proposal to freeze payment rates of family tax benefits (FTB) for 
two years, reductions in the value of FTB supplementary payments, a freeze on FTB 
eligibility thresholds, as well as a withdrawal of FTB part B payments from families 
once their youngest child turns six are expected to save $9.4 billion between 2015-16 
and 2018-19, more than recovering the cost of the new package (Whiteford & Nethery 
2015; Parliamentary Budget Office 2015). But one effect of these austerity measures, 
if they are to secure passage through Parliament, will create an increased need for 
families to find work in an insecure labour market, hinting at the way in which they 
support capitalist interests. 
 
Indeed, it is in the context of the labour market that we ought to understand the 
real impact of the new childcare package. Under the proposed arrangements, to 
qualify for 36 hours of subsidised, professionally-provided childcare, parents must 
work at least 8 hours per fortnight. If they wish to access 72, or the full 100 hours of 
subsidised care, parents must meet the requirements of 17 and 49 hours paid work 
respectively (Phillips 2015: 32; Whiteford & Nethery 2015). While such activity tests 
may appear progressive, one must view them within current conditions in the 
Australian labour market. While it is not possible here to provide a comprehensive 
survey, recent figures detail the labour market’s current weakness.6 From August 
2013 to August 2015 unemployment grew from 5.5 to 6.2 per cent (Australian Bureau 
of Statistics [ABS] 2015b). Overall employment levels, expressed as a proportion of 
the population aged 15 and over, fell from 61.5 per cent in 2013 to 60.8 per cent in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 These labour force figures detail conditions for those aged 15 and over. Unemployment, 
employment levels, participation rate, and labour underutilisation figures are averages of 
trend data for the 12 months to August of each year. This is consistent with Healy’s (2015: 
350) methodology, except the use of trend estimates, which offer a more accurate picture of 
month-to-month changes than original estimates (see ABS 2012).  
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2015 (ABS 2015b). In this context, labour underutilisation – defined as the sum of 
unemployed and underemployed workers, expressed as a proportion of the labour 
force (ABS 2015a) – has risen from 13.0 per cent in 2013 to around 14.5 per cent in 
2015 (ABS 2015c). Taken together, such figures suggest ‘continuing and widespread 
weakness in labour demand’ (Healy 2015: 350). This is despite the fact that overall 
labour market participation has increased from 64.6 per cent in 2014 to 64.8 in 2015 
(ABS 2015b). Whether a result of the government’s policies or not, supply has not 
produced its own demand. 
 
As Healy (2015: 351) notes, the gendered patterns that underlie these figures 
point to significant inequality. This is especially pertinent when considering family 
policy. Though the employment to population ratio fell more sharply from 2013 to 
2015 for men than it did for women – from 67.6 to 66.7 per cent, compared to 55.5 to 
55.0 per cent  – women only made up around 35.5 per cent of full-time employees, 
with men dominating full-time positions at 64.5 (ABS 2015b). These bleak prospects 
for female employment are especially concerning in the context of childcare, 
considering the dominant share of labour performed by women in family care 
structures (Hill 2014: 185). That there appear to be fewer prospects for female 
employment – full-time or otherwise – suggests a problematic shift for unemployed 
mothers to paid employment, especially those in low-income families.   
 
The government’s new spending on childcare will operate alongside pending 
cuts to the public sector. Those cuts that specifically target family benefits will, if 
implemented, reduce the amount of government assistance received by families, 
particularly those in receipt of lower incomes. Analysis of these measures detail that 
of those families who receive currently jeopardised family payments and utilise 
childcare subsidies, 62 per cent will be worse off overall due to the cuts to benefits 
(Phillips 2015: 34). Moreover, like the new childcare arrangements, those changes 
(mentioned above) made to family payments in the 2014-15 Budget were designed to 
‘encourage increased workforce participation by primary carers’ (Commonwealth of 
Australia 2014a: 198). This strategy is similarly present in policies directed at 
increasing youth workforce participation. Cuts to welfare payments that were 
developed in the 2014-15 Budget, which would force jobseekers under the age of 30 
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to undergo a six-month waiting period before receiving government benefits, were 
similarly directed towards inducing greater workforce participation (Healy 2015: 
354). This has since been amended to a four-week waiting period, and, despite being 
rejected by the Senate in September 2015, then Social Services Minister (now 
Treasurer) Scott Morrison expressed plans for its reintroduction (Conifer 2015). 
While the behavioural shifts that these labour-market activation policies may instigate 
are not possible to predict here, they are ‘unlikely to assist in job creation at a time of 
weak aggregate labour demand’ (Healy 2015: 354). Yet the fact that such policies 
encourage the integration of workers – particularly women – into the labour market, 
no matter its dynamic instabilities, emphasises the way in which austerity in welfare, 
alongside other measures, manifests as a political project that advances the interests of 
capital. 
 
Developments in the Australian economy highlight the reasons for continued 
state action, through austerity and other measures, to promote capitalist interests. 
Recent economic growth in Australia has been lacklustre. Gross domestic product 
grew by 2.6 per cent over 2012-13, as opposed to 3.7 per cent in 2011-12 (Lim, 
Nguyen & Chau 2014: 5). Government projections in early 2015 indicated that 
growth was remain sluggish, rising to around 2.75 per cent (Commonwealth of 
Australia 2015b: section 1-6). Yet these projections proved even to be too optimistic, 
with GDP growth weaker than predicted, rising just 0.2 per cent in the 2015 June 
quarter (Brinsden 2015). Amidst these conditions, an increase to the supply of labour 
during a time of weak demand is likely to increase the reserve army of labour, placing 
downward pressure on wage rates – ultimately serving the interests of capital through 
a decline in relative costs of production (Dunn 2014: 421). This is not to suggest that 
such policies are devised with the intent of eroding already weak labour market 
conditions. However, even government documents acknowledge the relationship 
between an oversupply of labour and wages growth. Indeed, this relationship is 
conceived as potentially beneficial to the process of boosting capitalist development: 
‘Subdued wage growth will help keep unit labour costs down and contribute to lower 
inflationary pressure’ (Commonwealth of Australia 2014b: section 2-18). In this way, 
austerity measures that force labour participation can be seen as a political project that 
favours the interests of capital over those of labour. 
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This would seem especially relevant considering current trends in domestic 
wage levels, where poor labour market conditions have produced weak wage growth. 
In 2014, despite a 3 per cent increase to the nominal value of the National Minimum 
Wage, the real value of Australian award wages failed to rise as these changes merely 
drew parallel with the rate of inflation, as measured by the consumer price index 
(Healy 2015: 360-1). This suggests that while the government’s political strategy of 
encouraging labour market participation through austerity and incentives may not 
promote actual job growth, it will likely continue to place downward pressures on 
wage growth. Far from signalling a withdrawal of the state from economic 
management, these policies illustrate the way in which the state has acted in light of 
deteriorating economic conditions. The combination of policies that incentivise 
labour-market participation with those that cut back welfare provision make clear the 
fact that the state has not taken a so-called pragmatic turn. Instead, it highlights the 
Australian state’s enduring commitment to a political project underpinned by 
austerity. Particularly, in virtue of the interests it serves, it suggests that such a project 
can only be understood in light of particular forces and processes that create demands 
on state managers to foster conditions conducive to capitalist accumulation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis has argued that the turn to austerity under the former Abbott 
government does not represent an idealistic and voluntary disentanglement of state 
from market relations. Rather the Australian state and the exercise of state power have 
been integral in the process of shaping austerity in the interests of certain social 
forces. This chapter has developed the notion of austerity as a political project that 
aimed to promote conditions conducive to the accumulation of capital. While strident 
resistance emerged to the fiscal strategy advanced by the Abbott government, the state 
played a crucial role in the management and integration of these opposing forces, in 
ways that ensured their demands were subordinated to particular interests. Moreover, 
the failure of change to materialise despite resistance suggests the continuing 
dominance of those forces discussed in Chapter Two that were involved in the 
struggle for austerity. Policies of fiscal austerity remained an integral part of the 
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Abbott government’s overall political strategy. More especially, however, austerity 
policies have not reflected an increasing separation of the state from the economy, but 
rather the reconfiguration of its relationship to economic management. Through the 
mechanism of generational accounting, the Abbott government may have given the 
impression that long-term spending patterns have been ‘reigned in’, but this ignores 
the dispersion of state capacities amongst institutions that austerity has entailed, and 
the way in which these shape conditions conducive to capitalist class action. The 
continuation of austerity in the 2015-16 Budget was also considered. This section 
detailed the political project advanced by the Abbott government, in which austerity 
plays an integral part. The Abbott government was not motivated by an abstract and 
vague political pragmatism, or by a commitment to a particular ideational framework. 
Rather social and economic pressures and processes have driven the forms and 
patterns of state action to shape conditions conducive to continued capitalist 
development, relations, and accumulation. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
This thesis has argued that austerity in Australia is a political project that is 
actively constructed and managed on the basis of imperatives created by social forces 
and interests. This line of analysis has been especially contrasted with an 
impoverished idealist, or ideational understanding of political economic change. 
These understandings, which have been widespread in commentaries on global 
political developments in general, as well as the Abbott government in Australia, 
problematically frame the state in abstraction from society and economy. Exercises of 
state power are thus often seen to emanate purely from the voluntary decisions of state 
managers themselves, as opposed to the actual origins of state power in a diverse 
range of forces embedded within a social formation, who respond to imperatives that 
arise as a consequence of their location in the structure of that formation (Panitch 
1999). In ideational accounts, austerity is thus reduced to a mere ‘dangerous idea’ 
(Blyth 2013a); its implementation is hardly one of contingency and struggle. Though 
the dominance austerity as an economic idea is acknowledged, there is little offered in 
the way of how and why such dominance is actually achieved and maintained. It is 
this understanding which this thesis has argued against, by drawing attention to the 
importance of understanding the interrelation between state, class, and austerity in 
Australia. 
 
Ideational explanations of austerity, which locate the principle within a 
framework of neoliberal ideas, conceive of these ideas as engineering a process of 
‘disembedding’. This is a process whereby a particularistic reform of market 
structures and institutions results in their ‘autonomisation’ from their social 
foundations. This narrative mistakenly leads one to the view that state and economy 
become necessarily separated through neoliberal processes and policies. However, as 
Marxist scholars emphasise, if the capitalist state and economy operate autonomously, 
this autonomy is only ever relative, given the mutual constitution of these structures 
by a complex of social relations and interests (Panitch 1999: 23). This does not negate 
the importance of a study of the ideological, but this should be tempered through a 
more specified consideration of the material forces and structures with which 
ideology is constituted and driven. It was in light of these considerations that this 
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thesis adopted an approach to understanding the state and politics that is grounded in 
recognition of the importance of social relational context (Jessop 2008). Policy 
outcomes are the product of the exercise of state power, which needs to be understood 
with reference to prevailing hierarchies of broader relations of power and interest, and 
the conflicts and struggles associated with establishing, maintaining, and (possibly) 
transforming these relationships. 
 
These theoretical insights have important implications for explaining the 
Australian state’s turn to austerity in 2014. The origins and sources of the austerity 
programme first significantly advanced by the Abbott government in their 2014-15 
Federal Budget must be located as part of a particular historical conjuncture, 
characterised by a certain constellation of forces and interests. The ground for the turn 
to austerity was secured through the political construction of crises. The manufacture 
of the former Labor government’s problems as political crises cleared the way for the 
Coalition’s construction of a fiscal crisis, or so-called ‘budget emergency’. The 
subsequent rise of an austerity politics in Australia from the actions and struggle of 
definite social forces figured as the basis for the construction of a political project, 
pursued by particular fractions and representatives of capital operating on the terrain 
of the state, employing the rationale that cutbacks to government expenditure serve 
the ‘common interest’.  
 
Importantly, in emphasising the role of these material forces, this thesis has 
not suggested that ideas do not matter. Rather, ideas are tied, and ‘internally related’ 
to the structures of the social world, and those conflicts that take place within these 
structures (Bieler & Morton 2008). Claims that austerity promotes the general, or 
common interest are not necessarily the product of overt fabrication. They are, 
however, misleading, as they assume that certain social relations are not founded on 
inherently conflictual interests. Ideas come to the fore in the time and place they do 
through the process of struggle, as argued in Chapter Two. In this way, the particular 
ideas advanced by one set of forces become, through the process of struggle and 
contingency, those that are actualised through the state apparatus. The real nature of 
the Australian state’s austerity measures as part of a political project that has its 
origins in the actions of a particular constellation of forces is emphasised when 
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considered in relation to austerity’s ideological nature. The way in which austerity 
was ‘sold’ by the Abbott government points to this fact. That is, this ‘sale’ can be 
understood as a particular manifestation of this process of struggle to advance an 
austere political project. This is evident in the way in which amongst the core 
narratives drawn upon by the Abbott government and other forces there was a 
unifying effect: the reification of certain social relationships, resulting in the 
obfuscation of the way in which austerity serves particular sectional interests. 
 
The Australian state has been integral at each stage of this struggle over 
austerity. In particular, this highlights the way in which those claims that have sought 
to cast the state as in retreat in the face of ‘free’ market forces are empirically and 
theoretically misleading. The Australian state has indeed remained pivotal through its 
management of the social contradictions and forms of resistance that arose as a result 
of conflict over austerity. Moreover, the state has advanced the interests at the heart of 
austerity considerably further, whether through the use of particular policy tools, or 
through changes to the nature and scales of state activity. Such actions certainly 
highlight the importance of the state to the reproduction of contemporary Australian 
capitalism. The Abbott government’s austerity project was reformulated and reframed 
in relation to a resistant political terrain, and fluctuating economic conditions. In 
effect, austerity thus remains a political project constructed through the imperatives 
created by social forces and interests, advanced through the exercise of state power. 
 
While the implications that follow from the conclusions of this thesis are not 
necessarily novel, they serve to restate Marxist arguments about the way in which the 
actions of the capitalist state ought to be studied. On an empirical level, that the 
Abbott government was wrongly considered to have retreated in light of political 
conflict does not preclude the actual possibility of policy backpedalling. However, the 
preceding analysis suggests that there are likely to be significant structural 
impediments to the development of adequate and effective resistance to austerity. 
More broadly, given that such resistance detailed in Chapter Four failed to elicit 
unequivocal change in policy, this suggests a continuity of neoliberal practice in 
Australia, as political developments are likely to extend (further) the subordination of 
labour, and other subaltern social groups to the continued reproduction of Australian 
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capitalism. On this point, scholars advancing ideational explanations are certainly 
right (Lloyd & Ramsay 2014/15: 41-2). Furthermore, this certainly has, even at such 
an early stage, some basis in the stated orientation of a Turnbull government, where 
Treasurer Scott Morrison (cited in Clarke 2015) has argued that Australia has a 
‘spending problem, not a revenue problem’. This thesis cannot project what will 
happen; continued austerity may fail dramatically to promote accumulation in 
Australia. Nothing within this thesis suggests that a political project must necessarily 
succeed.  
 
What the thesis has highlighted, on a theoretical level, is the centrality of the 
capitalist state as a determinant and object of conflict, despite – indeed, because of – a 
politics of neoliberalism and austerity. In contrast to those idealist or ideational 
accounts that would cast the state as ‘withering away’, this thesis has demonstrated 
that, as a political project rather than simply an idea, austerity demands particular 
forms of state action. The way in which the state acts in any given period or 
conjuncture – whether more or less ‘active’ in provision or management of market 
services – must be viewed in relation to the way in which these actions are configured 
on the basis of a balance of social forces. An apparent paradox of austerity in recent 
developments – its durability in the face of failure – dissolves if we begin to see 
market and state forces and structures as ontologically constituted by class and other 
social relations (Bruff 2011). The implications of this are not just that austerity, as a 
political project, has a class, as well as gendered, and racial bias, as commentators 
have certainly demonstrated (Blyth 2013a, 14; Elson 2013; Jensen 2013). It is instead, 
fundamentally, a form of class politics. Austerity, in whatever manifestation, requires 
active construction, is embedded in capitalist social relations, and is the product of 
struggle over the distribution of resources, wealth, and power. 
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